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ABSTRACT

Embedded in the way we use the law is the tendency of human reason to
justification, in the words of one philosopher, “the thirst for rationality that creates lies.”
I contend that this tendency is exacerbated by the conflation of what is knowable as a
matter of science, and that which we might believe is normative. I rely on Kant’s critique
of theoretical and practical reason to assess claims to objectivity in social science
approaches to law, and to suggest it is not surprising that the operation of theoretical and
practical reason would tend to the conflation of the descriptive and the normative. When
we understand the illusions of which reason is capable, we may be more circumspect
about claims of objective knowledge and more willing to challenge assertions of a single
right answer on normative issues (the modus operandi of most legal argumentation).
Nevertheless, we have a sense that there are objective standards of right and
wrong, bespeaking right answers, if not single right answers, on difficult issues, and these
are the basis for ethics, if not law. How does one bring broad universalisms down to
practical application, and have the confidence one’s judgments are right, and not
someone else’s view of dogmatism? I discuss the mystery that lies behind the process of
judgment, and conclude that the best check against the illusions of reason is our ability to
have a relation with, and understand the viewpoints of, others. In particular, I consider
Buber’s concept of dialogue, and how it might affect common types of ethical decisions
in business.
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CONCLUSION

[T]here is a natural and unavoidable dialectic of pure
reason, not one in which a bungler might be entangled
through lack of acquaintance, or one that some sophist has
artfully invented to confuse rational people, but one that
irremediably attaches to human reason, so that even after
we have exposed the mirage it will still not cease to lead
our reason with false hopes, continually propelling it into
momentary aberrations that always need to be removed.
- Immanuel Kant1
I.

INTRODUCTION
In this Article, I want to reconcile philosophically how we approach and deal with

the difference between law and ethics in business decisions, particularly when the
argumentation of the law may only tells us what is required or permitted, on the one
hand, as against what ethical duties or responsibilities might demand, on the other.
Sometimes the issue of ethical duty is wholly internal to the individual with no
clear legal implication. Many years ago, KFC had been recently purchased by R.J.
Reynolds. I recall one of the lawyers for KFC quietly telling me how uncomfortable it
was to be working for a tobacco company. I thought about it. How would I react?
Would my moral qualms about the sale and marketing of tobacco cause me to consider
changing jobs? But I had young children at the time. Imagine the conflicting duties. My
1

Immanuel Kant, CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON, trans. Paul Guyer & Allen W. Wood (1998), at 386-87
(A298/B354).

wife and children rely on my income, and are settled in a community because of my job.
Do my moral concerns about contributing to the success of a tobacco company outweigh
the difficulties I might cause to my family if I change jobs? How might I go about
deciding and justifying the decision?
Sometimes there is the same kind of issue of internal conscience, but with broader
moral if not legal ramifications. I left the law firm and became a senior executive in a
series of industrial companies. One of them made automotive components. There was a
committee of engineers and lawyers known as the Product Integrity Committee. Its job
was to investigate claims of product defects, and to determine whether there was a defect,
and to recommend, if necessary, broad warranty campaigns or even product recalls.
Determining that federal law required a recall involved a two-step analysis: was there a
defect, and did the defect pose an unreasonable risk to highway safety? There often was,
at least in theory, a defect, though even that inquiry had its gray areas. The harder
determination was whether the company believed the defect posed an unreasonable risk
to highway safety. The issue was not so simple as merely to issue a recall for every
suspected failure – if one recalled 400,000 vehicles for an illusory or inconsequential
defect, and it took the dealer three hours to replace the part at, say, $35 per hour, the cost
to the component company could be in excess of $40 million, often for a part that was
originally sold for a few cents. How did one, in those circumstances, balance the
conflicting duties to the public and of financial prudence?
Later, I worked for a chemical company that made flame retardant additives for
plastics. There was no question that the product, in preventing furniture fires, or fires in
television or computer or printer housings, saved lives. But there were open and

© Jeffrey M. Lipshaw 2006

2

unresolved questions (all being subjected to scientific study by the industry and
environmental groups) about the environment impact of the product – its pervasiveness
and persistence in the environment, its ability to accumulate in our bodies, and its
toxicity, if any. There the issue was slightly different. Thousands of jobs and livelihoods
depended on the production of the product. There were legitimate concerns and
arguments on both sides of the environmental debate – and how did one make the
utilitarian judgment of the greatest good when weighing short-term benefits and longterm costs were almost impossible to calculate?
Those all invoked one broad set of conflicting duties and responsibilities. There
was another kind, however, and not always as sharply focused. These were conflicts that
arose between and among people or groups of people, sometimes involving conflicts of
duties but sometimes not. One set involves the difficult choice: harm to someone is
inevitable, and the choice is where it will fall. I am writing several days after Delphi
Corporation, the auto parts company created as a spin-off from General Motors, has
become the largest corporate bankruptcy in the history of the United States automotive
industry.2 Delphi hired Robert “Steve” Miller, a chief executive described as “Mr. Fix-It
for American industry, stepping in to help large, once-dominant businesses confront and
manage ugly realities, sorting through hard choice about wage cuts or plant closures or
termination of pension plans.”3
The reverse, it seems to me, of the tough choice, is the one in which it is not clear
that any real harm will result, but there is tremendous conflict between people or
organizations, with an overwhelming drive to prove that one’s side is right. I had

2
3

Jeffrey McCracken, Reassembling Delphi, WALL ST. J., Oct. 17, 2005, at B1.
Id.
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observed the drawn out battle over what often seemed to be ephemeral territories in
corporate and law firm life: central office versus the outlying branches; support functions
versus line management; debates between business units over fixed cost allocations that
had no impact on the corporate bottom line; lawyers who saw business clients as rash,
sloppy and unthinking opportunists, and business clients who saw lawyers as
impediments to getting anything done.
Consider all of these issues then (and hundreds more like them) faced in business
(if not in life) every day, and how they might be addressed within the legal academy.
And imagine my surprise, returning after an absence of a quarter-century to academic
exegesis on the law, to find the dominance that economic thinking, as a subset of a more
general scientific or naturalistic world view, had come to have. And while one must give
credit to the subtleties that behavioral economics and the old and new institutional
economics seek to add to the much simpler models of economic actors as wholly rational
calculators of their best interest, nevertheless, the idea that there might be science that
could explain or predict or direct an ethical decision – that almost transcendental moment
of exquisite judgment – was to me just plain counter-intuitive.
Moreover, it seemed to me possible, indeed commonplace, to adopt a utilitarian
ethic in this circumstance, and justify harm to others by concerning for the greater good.
If we do not sacrifice the jobs of X number of employees, many times X will suffer. It is
possible to make those decisions with all the moral insight of Judge Posner’s memorable
allusion to the internal decision-making process of the rational economic actor, which is
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to say: none. We might as well be speaking not about the mind and soul of a human
being, but of a frog.4
I believe there is a thread that connects the examples of ethical or moral dilemma
in business decision making, and I am not satisfied that invoking the discipline of social
science adequately describes it or provides guidance. The issue, I believe, goes to the
dignity and discipline of the answer. I am not preparing to say that I or anyone else has
access to the literal mind of God, or as a next best alternative, a derivation from natural
law, by which the answers to these question appear magically in moments of blinding
insight. We do a disservice, however, not to expose lawyers to world views other than
the purely scientific, and teach some of the secular thinking, developed over centuries,
that probes fundamental questions of duty in a way that is just as rigorous, just as
disciplined, and just as worthy of respect, as the application of formulas, algorithms and
cost curves to the data of experience. We live in a world in which bad things happen, and
the laws of economics operate inexorably, and yet we may make decisions about what to
do in a way that is morally more acceptable (even if no easier) than counting noses and
minimizing the cost of severance. 5

4

Richard A. Posner, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, 6th ed. (2003), at 17:
The basic assumption, that human behavior is rational, seems
contradicted by the experiences and observations of everyday life. The
contradiction is less acute when one understands that the concept of
rationality used by the economist is objective rather than subjective, so
that it would not be a solecism to speak of a rational frog. Rationality
means little more than a disposition to choose, consciously or
unconsciously, an apt means to whatever ends the chooser happens to
have.
5
For evidence that rational actor theory continues to live on in the legal academy, and, indeed, is applied to
questions of professional responsibility (if not ethics), see David McGowan, Some Realism About
Parochialism: The Economic Analysis of Legal Ethics, 8 LEGAL ETHICS (2005). One cannot accuse
Professor McGowan of incipient Platonism in elevating rational actor to a theory of everything. Rather, I
would call his approach pragmatic defeatism: because we can never agree on values (his characterization,
not mine), we are better off simply calculating the consequences of a particular policy. I also take issue
with the assertion that being forced to do a cost-benefit analysis of a policy “forces one to look at all sides
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Let me lay out what I think are the roots of the problem. Studying law is, in the
first instance, a descriptive enterprise about we may do, but it is closely aligned with, or
overlapping, or perhaps identical with what we ought to do. From the first day of torts
and contracts and civil procedure, we are asking the question: what is the law governing
this issue? If I fail to perform the contract, will I held be liable for damages? If I am
sitting in the stands at a baseball game and am hit by a broken bat, do I have a claim for
damages against the baseball club? If I believe the facts alleged in the complaint do not
articulate a recognized cause of action, what are my procedural options?
But there is also an ongoing normative aspect, in which we either judge the law
itself against some other standard – justice, fairness, efficiency – or compare the result of
the law to the result we would expect from our sense of morality. In a classic case used
to teach the concept of a unilateral contract, one in which the offer makes it clear that it
may be accepted only by completion of performance and not by a counter-promise, the
offeror, knowing that the offeree is knocking at the door, calling out that he is prepared to
complete the performance, the offeror revokes the offer, and the offeree is left without
recourse.6 One must, I think, ask the students to consider whether that result comports
with their own sense of justice; indeed, later developments in the binding effect of a
promise on which the offeree reasonably relies to his detriment make it clear there was a
normative issue at play.
I suspect none of the foregoing has changed much in law school in the last
hundred years. What has changed over that same period is the inter-disciplinary way we
of a question.” Id. Indeed, this becomes an easy, if not particularly rigorous or satisfying, epistemology:
“[Cost-benefit analysis] forces you to ask how you know what you claim to know, which pushes thinking
toward consequences and away from concepts. Such consequentialist reasoning is necessary to
accommodate the conflicts of interests heterogeneous societies always have.” Id.
6
Petterson v. Pattberg, 248 N.Y. 86, 161 N.E. 428 (1928).
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think about and study law. Here is the irony, or dilemma, I contend we face. The study
of law as social science imputes science, and I am comfortable that the descriptive and
explanatory enterprise is perfectly amenable to scientific structures. We may be awed by
the order we see in nature (the philosophical term is “teleology” which implies ends or
purposiveness to the universe), but that is a wholly different from the answer to the
question: what caused the phenomenon that inspired such awe. "Intelligent design" is a
perfectly acceptable matter of discussion for religion or secular philosophy, but it is
unacceptable for science.7 Nevertheless, the hybrid discipline that is academic law has
never, to my mind, satisfactorily sorted out the distinction between its fit into modern
interdisciplinary social science and the oft-cited mission to educate lawyers as problemsolvers. Hence, it is all well and good for Judge Posner to suggest even a rational frog
would make sense as the subject of economic modeling, but does that model or any other
purporting to be science aid the frog in making ex ante decisions about what it ought to
do?
In a letter to Stanford Law School alumni,8 Dean Larry Kramer addressed the
issue of educating lawyers in an increasingly inter-disciplinary academic environment.
Citing “a weakness of traditional legal training”9 and an education that remains “too
narrow and technical”10 Dean Kramer’s vision is ambitious:
[T]his is about more than enhanced skills training or
keeping up with the Jones. Lawyers are actors in all of the
most important aspects of governing a liberal democratic
society. The world needs lawyers with the perspective and
vision to make positive contributions to the problems we
7

See Thomas Nagel, Secular Philosophy and the Religious Temperament, available at
http://www.law.nyu.edu/clppt/program2005/readings/secular_philosophy.pdf (last visited, Oct. 6, 2005).
8
Larry D. Kramer, Creating Interdisciplinary Education, 71 STAN. LAW. 3 (2005).
9
Id.
10
Id.
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face, and who can do so with responsibility and
comprehension, not merely by settling into the role of
lawyer/advocate.11
Is the scientific study of law prepared thus to educate lawyers?12 Do our current
academic endeavors encourage responsibility as well as comprehension, and if so, by
what standard?
Whether or not he meant it that way, Dean Kramer captured the tensions that
result from academic law’s transition to inter-disciplinary scholarship out of its
professional trade school roots.13 I interpret comprehension to include the “what” and
“why” of the law – as I tell my students, not just the instrumental approaches one takes as
the lawyer for a party, but understanding what is happening from our standpoint as
historians, philosophers, economists, linguists and social critics. Does the comprehension
of that “what” and “why” also, without more, teach responsibility? It certainly teaches
what we might do, but that is a far cry from teaching what we ought to do.
Responsibility implies ethics: not the comprehension of what is the law, but the
consideration of what we ought to do, which in turn may or may not be addressed by the
law. Moreover, if academic law has been, in the words of one legal philosopher, the
subject, of “technological colonization,”14 how do we address the “ought?” After more
than a century of critique by consequentials, pragmatists, realists, and positivists on the
11

Id.
When I refer to the study of law as “science” I mean primarily the scholarship of the last forty years or
so, including the Wisconsin law and society school, the predominance of law and economics, and the recent
development of so-called “empirical” approaches.
13
See Brian Leiter, Why Is It So Easy to Get Tenure in Law Schools? available at http://leiterreports.
typepad.com/blog/2004/06/why_is_it_so_ea.html> (originally posted, August 23, 2003; last visited,
September 29, 2005). See also ABA Section of Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar, LEGAL
EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT – AN EDUCATIONAL CONTINUUM, REPORT OF THE TASK
FORCE ON LAW SCHOOLS AND THE PROFESSION: NARROWING THE GAP (1992), at 3 (“The transition during
this century from a clerkship/mentoring system of educating lawyers to reliance on professional schools in
a university setting has been traced by many observers to the acceptance of the Langdellian appellate casemethod, which views the study of law as an academic science.”)
14
Linda Ross Meyer, Is Practical Reason Mindless? 86 GEO. L. J. 647, 673-74 (1998).
12
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extent to which the positive law incorporates natural law truths about what we ought to
do, by and large, legal realism and positivism dominate current thinking.15 The law is a
social institution, informed, perhaps, in moral societies by morality, but not necessarily
so. To suggest, as does Professor Dworkin, that there is an accessible but transcendental
codification of right and wrong, is to leave us wondering how it is we merely accept, on
his word, his version of the “deep structures” of law.16
That we continue to debate the interrelationship of law and morality is prima facie
evidence of conflation and confusion of the two. There is a distinction between the
ability of the social science models of the law to aid in the construction of policy, versus
the ability of the models to provide the basis for secular ethics. Indeed, that is the begged
question in Judge Posner’s set of assumptions. Even granting that rationality means
nothing more than the ability to choose the means to an end, whence comes the end? The
synergistic effect of legal positivism and an interdisciplinary approach to law and the
“human sciences,”17 it seems to me, is a presumption of a consequentialist view of
morality, if any view is to be taken at all.18 My goal is not to critique movements like
15

Natural law, legal positivism, and legal realism are succinctly summarized in three essays: Brian Bix,
Natural Law Theory, in Dennis Patterson, ed., A COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL THEORY
(1999), at 223-40; Jules L. Coleman & Brian Leiter, Legal Positivism, id., at 241-60; and Brian Leiter,
Legal Realism, id., at 261-80.
16
Ronald Dworkin, “Hart’s Postscript and the Character of Political Philosophy,” 24 OXFORD J. LEGAL
STUD. 1 (2004); Dennis Patterson, “Dworkin on the Semantics of Legal and Political Concepts,” 25
(2005), forthcoming, 25 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. <http://ssrn.com/abstract=688781>; Jeffrey M. Lipshaw,
“Freedom, Compulsion, Compliance and Mystery: Reflections on the Duty Not to Enforce a Promise,”
forthcoming, LAW, CULTURE & THE HUMANITIES (2006).
17
See Ian Shapiro, THE FLIGHT FROM REALITY IN THE HUMAN SCIENCES (2005), at 2 (“quantitative and
formally oriented social sciences that are principally geared toward causal explanation”).
18
See Anita Bernstein, Whatever Happened to Law and Economics? 64 MD. L. REV. 303, 311-15 (2005)
(describing the debate among advocates of differing consequentialist theses – efficiency versus wealth
maximization versus welfare). Professor Bernstein also aptly characterizes the black box that is the mind
of the rational frog of Judge Posner’s metaphor: “We believe the frog pursues here own ends, but we have
nothing but her behavior to look at when we seek support for that belief.” Id., at 311. Judge Posner hardly
invented the concept of consequentialist morality; it was David Hume who most famously observed that
reason is slave to our passions. For a comparison of Posnerian and Humean skepticism, see Martha C.
Nussbaum, Still Worthy of Praise, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1776 (1998): 1776: “Reading Richard Posner’s
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law and economics (Professor Bernstein and others have already done a thorough job of
it) but deal with how we, as complex humans, might rigorously explore the ex ante issues
of “ought” from a non-consequentialist perspective.19 Indeed, I prefer to think of ethics
as the deontological ex ante: not knowing what the consequences will be, and not being,
in every instance, mere rational frogs, what ought to be our ends?
But there are voices, particularly after the corporate scandals grouped under the
rubrics “Enron” and “WorldCom,” groping for a way to articulate a secular “ought” that
goes beyond mere rational calculation.20 We are exploring that moment of transcendence
in the application of a rule, and what, if not religion, guides us? To use the jargon of the
physical or social scientist, there is data suggesting that purposes and ends make a
significant difference in the world. If you are a positivist, and do not believe any human
can claim knowledge of (versus the occasional and fleeting insight into) the mind of God,
still: why care? Why strive? Why do pragmatic philosophers seek to justify
pragmatism? How is that possibly pragmatic? Go do something useful instead. Even
pragmatists, I think, want to believe there is something out there beyond the cold parsing

[‘Problematics’ article] is something like reading Hume’s Treatise with the Hume removed: like, that is,
encountering the implausibly mechanistic picture of human personality and the defiant debunking of
reason’s pretensions without at the same time, and inseparably, encountering the gentle, playful, and manycolored mind, thoroughly delighted by reason and human complexity, incomparably deft in argument, that
again and again soars beyond and dives beneath the rigid structures it has erected for itself.”
19
Professor Bernstein observes that consequential theory is more focused on the ex ante policy making
perspective: “those who make law ought to strive to improve welfare not so much by reaching the right
answer in a particular dispute but by writing doctrine that would foster the goods that law and economics
says we all pursue: efficiency, wealth-maximization, welfare, better-offedness, or what you will.”
Bernstein, supra note , at 326. Professor Bernstein cites several “ex post” antagonists to
consequentialism: corrective justice theorists, who emphasize compensation over deterrence in tort law,
retribution tradition in criminal law, and “the embrace of Kantian theory within legal theory.” Id., at 327.
20
I note two articles that raised interesting questions on this subject from the 2003 corporate law
symposium at the University of Cincinnati. Donald Langevoort approached the question of intra-corporate
candor – clearly an issue of ethics – within a broader treatment of agency law. Donald C. Langevoort,
Agency Law Inside the Corporation: Problems of Candor and Knowledge, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 1187
(2003). Marleen O’Connor addressed the question who, if anyone, is responsible for teaching ethics and
values (like candor). Marleen O’Connor, The Enron Board: The Perils of Groupthink,” 71 U. CIN. L.
REV. 1233, 1315-16 (2003).
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of positivist classification; in a charming phrase, they seek to dispense with “theory
guilt,” even though they feel compelled to theorize philosophically why they ought not to
feel guilty.21 Pragmatism has a feel to others (like me) of so much question-begging
(even if on a day-to-day basis it is so, well, pragmatic).22 Yet much of the serious
epistemic wrestling in the law nowadays is left to legal scholars with a particular
religious outlook, and who are willing to engage in public reconciliation of those deeply
held beliefs with the modern scholarship of law.
I will argue that the confusion between the “is” and the “ought” of law starts with
fundamental confusion over the extent to which even scientific knowledge is possible.
The first task is to disentangle the proto-science and ethics of the law, and this entails
unpacking the workings of reason itself in the scientific effort of comprehension and
normative effort of responsibility. In Larry Kramer’s terms, comprehension of the law as
social science is critical for policy. If we fail to create rigorous predictive theories, the
use of law as social curative is mere gambling. But we need to be very, very careful in
positing those things we know a priori, for fear of clothing a deontological source for
conclusions in scientific jargon. Making claims of knowledge is the very essence of
science, but those claims are always contingent and not necessary, and, at least in theory,
are capable of disproof by contrary empirical data. Claims of what we ought to do are
equally capable of purported universality, but they are never capable of disproof, and,

21

Catharine Pierce Wells, Why Pragmatism Works for Me, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 347 (2000).
In her biting critique of law and economics, Professor Bernstein contends that, as its ability to be
coherent as a scientific theory has come under attack, law and economics has morphed in various ways. In
particular, she observes that “Judge Posner sought to recharacterize law and economics as a subset of
‘pragmatism,’ jettisoning for his purpose more familiar philosophical understandings of this word.
Bernstein, supra note , at 322-23. For another view of how Judge Posner’s pragmatism is significantly
more doctrinaire in its conclusions than other forms, see Jeffrey M. Lipshaw, “Contingency & Contracts:
A Philosophy of Complex Business Transactions,” DePaul Law Review 54, (2005): 1077, 1109-13, 112025.

22

© Jeffrey M. Lipshaw 2006

11

hence, never of knowledge. To put it otherwise, if there is already a teleological aspect to
science – that the empirical world may be made intelligible by operation of our reason –
then it is not surprising that other less universal assumptions about ends (e.g. that welfare
or wealth maximization ought to trump fairness in determining policy) seep into what
purports to be the descriptive study of law.
Having set the bounds of what we may know as scientific truth, the second task is
to articulate a basis for ethics, or what Dean Kramer calls responsibility. If theory-driven
social science is bad for science, it is also bad for how we think about ethics. It suggests
either that morality can be scientifically derived, or presumes, if we are to think about the
“ought” of responsibility, the way to go is some form of consequentialism. But therein
lies the problem with the conflation of science and morality in the law. It is an empirical
reality that when we do search for purposes and ends (assuming that we have not
pragmatically dispensed with the need for the search), it most often a schizophrenic
exercise. We recognize there is mystery, and perhaps universal truths, but, at the same
time we clearly understand, despite a lifetime of searching of effort, we are doomed to
fail in anything but the faintest approach to an answer. And in the face of that fatalistic
understanding, we search anyway. No wonder that as social scientists in this hybrid
realm, we loathe the very idea we may be incapable of clear and ultimate answers to our
hardest cases.
Is there a way to articulate, much less teach, responsibility? Here, I want to learn
from, yet reach beyond, Kant. Kant knew that he could not state the categorical
imperative as a matter of truth. What he drew from the transcendental was practical
reason, the ability of the mind to derive ends as a matter of duty that was free of all
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physical desires and material inclinations. While Kant himself articulated applications
of the categorical imperative, his great contribution was the architectonic, the structure of
moral thought. We are still left to fill in what practical reason demands in each instance,
and one person’s duty can be another person’s dogmatic horror. To rely on the
categorical imperative as somehow putting forth a guide to action in each specific
instance is to beg the question. We cannot prove it, but the universality of first
assumptions tells us there is something else, and it is the source of all judgments.
It is fashionable now to pick apart the work of Ronald Dworkin (I have done it
myself); yet the liberal values he espouses, and wants us to admire in the law, are ones
we often share. But we are unwilling to take as a given, merely on his word, or anyone’s
word, that those values are the ones that must be embedded in positive law to make it
legitimately law. Nevertheless, serious scholars continue to explore the mystery, usually
without acknowledging it as such – in attempts to find unified theories of contract,23 to
put economic structure around altruism,24 or in the notion that the remedies of torts
satisfy a human need for justice and balance.25
What I have been trying to do is help revive the dignity of secular and
universal discussion about teleology – the notion that we are hard-wired to see purposes
and ends and intelligibility in all things. I am interested in the indeterminacy that rests at
the core of all attempts to know or to decide or to judge. That is to say, I wish to
illuminate, recognizing I will never explain, that moment when we fit, or do not fit, data
into a pre-existing model. That was Kant's enterprise in the Critique of Judgments 23

Nathan Oman, Unity and Pluralism in Contract, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1483 (2005); Jody S. Kraus,
Reconciling Autonomy and Efficiency in Contract Law: The Vertical Integration Strategy, 11 PHIL. ISSUES
420 (2001).
24
See note
.
25
Alan Calnan, A REVISIONIST HISTORY OF TORT LAW (2005).
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showing the transcendence of either determining or reflecting judgments: there is no rule
for the application of a rule. It is a wholly unscientific project, because while I puzzle
with it, and struggle with it, at the same time I know I can never resolve it. The sheer
volume of writing on the subject tells us there is some overlap between law and morality,
and it is therefore not far-fetched to suggest lawyers who are not also ethicists may
unduly emphasize the legal over the moral.26
I believe when we understand the extent to which our reason incorporates ends
into scientific inquiry, we are (a) more circumspect in claiming what is true or good as a
matter of science, and (b) humbler and more reflective, if no less principled, concerned,
or passionate, in making claims about what is right. Indeed, the process of legal
argumentation is gasoline on the fire of rationalization. Whether or not we have an
experiential basis for so concluding, our reason drives us (out of what needs for comfort,
security, reassurance, wholeness, who knows?) to conclusions about truth. Whether or
not it comports with truth, we are consumed with proving that we are right.

The resort

to law to resolve disputes is precisely this process of justification. In the typical business
conflict, what the economists perceive as opportunism may instead be the rationalization
of the current “is” to what we desire that it ought to be.
The real answer is that judgment, particularly when it comes to ethics, is not
purely an exercise in reason. There is no rule for the application of a rule. I will argue
26

I think the most articulate expression of this is Martha Nussbaum’s “Still Worthy.” She captures what I
think are both the limits and the opportunities of this project:
Probably argument rarely persuades people to depart altogether from
their most settled views. What it more commonly does, however, is to
bring to the surface a part of one's moral view that has been obscured or
inconsistently applied. Frequently the systematic power of ethical
theory is a great help in this sort of argument, ordering what is until
then disordered, rendering explicit what is nameless and thus easily
denied or effaced.
Nussbaum, supra note , at 1793.
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that modern natural law theories fail to work as the basis for an ethical code, not because
there is anything particularly troubling with the behavior they advocate (unlike the
normative implications of rational choice or behavioral economic theory). The real
problem is the answer “because I said so” in the modern sensibility. Any claim to insight
into natural law as a matter of knowledge has stepped beyond that which can be argued.
So to argue, a la Dworkin, that something in the empirical world, like law, can only be
considered law if you buy his noumena, seems to be really beyond argument. Moreover,
both natural law and virtue ethics presume, fundamentally, a linkage between the right
and the good, that virtue leads to happiness, and that is simply too much for the modern
sensibility. It is far less satisfying, epistemologically, to come to terms with the idea that
we simply must live with the questions rather than the answers, but I think that is at least
an intellectually honest answer that resonates with thoughtful people. Thus, I turn at last
to the concept of a defeasible intuitionism – one that acknowledges the mystery at the
core of these issues, and provides a basis for constructive and inferential dialogue about
the “ought.”
Is it possible to make a universal claim about ethics? It seems to me, yes, but
only in the very broadest sense and with a humble insight into what is right (or even
dictated by natural law), versus what is articulated by rule.27 Yet believing one has
access to the “ought” as though it were truth brings us right back around to dogmatism or
absolutism. What I hope to achieve is a basis for a reflective intuitional ethics (as distinct

27

I have previously visited the subject of the inadequacy of rules in the context of corporate governance.
See Jeffrey M. Lipshaw, Sarbanes-Oxley, Jurisprudence, Insurance, Game-Theory and Kant: Toward a
Moral Theory of Good Governance, 50 WAYNE L. REV. 1083 (2005): 1083-1146. For a less theoretical
statement of the same point, see the advertisement for the services of PriceWaterhouseCoopers suggesting
that rules, such as those set forth in Sarbanes-Oxley, must defer to principles we think “on a macro level.”
“Can everyone be expected to do the right thing?*” WALL ST. J. (Sept. 27, 2005), at A13.
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from law) in the conscious, conscientious and persistent effort to overcome
rationalization. That is not to say we are never right. It is to say instead that ethics
involves being open to truth rather than justification. I think an answer lies in the
philosophy of second-person relationships. But merely understanding such relationships
as conferring a unique status to make claims and demands on another is insufficient, in
my views, for distinguishing law from ethics. Claims, demands, and their defenses are
still creations of reason, and therefore subject to the dark side of reason: dogmatism and
rationalization. I contend that there is something to our non-inferential intuitions about
others and that reason is capable of explaining them away, or justifying action not in
accord with the intuition. Only through a direct second-person understanding of others
do we avoid justification.
II.

FROM REASON TO LAW’S RATIONALIZATION
Bernard Nussbaum, a senior partner at Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz in
New York City, became Counsel to the President in 1993. He resigned in
March, 1994, due to the political fallout after having counseled the
President and First Lady to resist the Justice Department’s attempt to
search the office of Vincent Foster immediately after Foster’s suicide.
“Asserting a lawyer’s prerogative to control information, Nussbaum
insisted that he review all the documents in Foster’s office first, in order to
decide whether any of them should be kept confidential. . . . Months later,
when Nussbaum appear before the [Senate] committee, he professed
bewilderment at the fuss his obstruction had provoked. Virtually any
lawyer would have done as he did, he said, with unfortunate plausibility.”
Nussbaum claimed his resignation was “the result of a controversy
generated by those who do not understand, nor wish to understand the
role and obligations of a lawyer, even one acting as White House
Counsel.”28

28

William H. Simon, The Confidentiality Fetish, ATLANTIC MONTHLY (December, 2004):
,
http://www.law.columbia.edu/law_school/communications/reports/winter2005/confidental; Letter from
Bernard W. Nussbaum to the Honorable Bill Clinton, March 5, 1994, available at
http://www.resignation.com/15.html (last visited, Jan. 11, 2006).
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How could a lawyer as brilliant and accomplished as Bernard Nussbaum make
such a calamitous misjudgment? To answer the question, I propose to go back to the
very process by which our minds (particularly legal minds) make sense of the world – or,
in the most general way, how we recognize what is and what ought to be. Part of what
we do, whether as lawyers or physical scientists or social scientists, is to explain the
world as it is – to engage in what is commonly referred to as a descriptive exercise.
Indeed, we often disclaim any aspect of normativity in the exercise. I can hear a chief
executive officer or a law firm senior partner saying “don’t tell me what I ought to do –
tell me what the law is.” And we view that as a legitimate request, perceiving that we are
capable of describing acts and consequence within a model of the world that is the legal
system. Nussbaum, I believe, was following in a rich, century-old tradition of
Langdellian or Holmesian legal science, and, no doubt, doing his best not only to
advocate for his client, but to predict for his client, to the best of his ability, how a court
of law (not public opinion) would ultimately judge the act of resisting the Justice
Department investigation.
Academic law is different now than it was in the days of Langdell and Holmes.
While we still teach doctrine, we now regularly seek to explain the law in crossdisciplinary fashion, using the models of physical and social science – economics,
psychology, and anything else that might bring enlightenment to bear. So we seek to
explain, to theorize, to find causal connections like social scientists, but we are doing it in
the context of a discipline whose practitioners will also be required to advise their clients
on what they ought to do. So I want to understand the process by which the very way we
think may cause us to confuse the descriptive exercise with the normative.
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While I will be discussing what we might know objectively and what we might
not, and about distinctions in our ability to make truth claims in matters of nature versus
matters of morality, I do not intend to get bogged down in analysis of the various “-isms”
into which my own philosophy may fall.29 It is entirely possible I am trying to have my
cake and eat it too as regards the issue of objective knowledge. Kant scholar Susan
Neiman argues that, despite the epistemological quandaries driving modern philosophy,
the “natural, urgent and pervasive” questions arise out of our “demand that the world be
intelligible” as a matter of practical and theoretical reason.30 And despite the heavily
epistemological focus in what follows, I agree with her general conclusion: “The
question of whether this is an ethical or metaphysical problem is as unimportant as it is
undecidable, for in some moments it’s hard to view as a philosophical problem at all.”31
Am I arguing there is no objective knowledge, even in matters of nature? Of course not.
What I am grappling with is a practical problem – what should we do. Common sense
tells me there is a significance difference in the objectivity possible as between nature
and morality, yet at the margins less so than we might otherwise think. All of this is even
more confused because our moral judgments feel like they ought to be describable in
terms of truth or falsity.
I claim no victory or easy answers in trying to sort this out; indeed, David Hume,
more than two hundred years ago, wryly observed the problem of conflating what is with
what we contend ought to be. Hume noted that “the author proceeds for some time in the
ordinary ways of reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, or makes observations
29

For a compact summary of the classifications of modern ethical philosophy, see the editors’ introductory
essay Toward Fin de Siècle Ethics: Some Trends in Stephen Darwall, Allen Gibbard, & Peter Railton, ed.,
MORAL DISCOURSE & PRACTICE 3 (1997).
30
Neiman, EVIL, supra note , at 5-7.
31
Id., at 7.
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concerning human affairs; when of a sudden I am surpriz'd to find, that instead of the
usual copulations of propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no proposition that is not
connected with an ought, or an ought not.”32 I believe Nussbaum made the jump from
“is” to “ought” in just this way. He saw the world as it was with the eyes of a lawyer,
and moved immediately to the conclusion that “is” bespoke “ought:” legal justification
would serve as general justification of an action. I can only speculate that, within the
four walls of the offices in which he and his clients discussed the response to the
controversy, he was reasoned, persuasive, and truly believed himself to be acting with the
legal and ethical bounds of a lawyer’s professional canons. His fundamental failure was
not a legal error (indeed, he may have been entirely correct) nor even, really, a political
one. The real problem was, I think, that he persuaded himself he was right, because his
reason told him what ought to be the legal result, and that effort was a massive exercise in
self-deception, not because he was wrong about the law, but because he was wrong about
the world.
The very process by which we reason to conclusions (or, like lawyers, create
argumentation in support of our positions) is capable of pouring gasoline on the fire of
difficult decisions or disputes. Our reason is capable of allowing to solve problems, but it
is also capable of rationalization, justification, and in the end, self-deception. When we
add to the mix the possibility of jumping from what we claim to be an impartial
description of what is) to often unstated presumptions about what is either good or right,
we go to the heart of the dilemma of business ethics. The point of business is utilitarian:
to maximize something we have concluded is a good – profits, productivity, sales, or
share price, to name some of the common alternatives. But the business game has rules,
32

David Hume, A TREATISE ON HUMAN NATURE, Ernest C. Mossner, ed. (1985) (1739), at 521.
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and companies espouse values, and the question is whether, when there is a tension
between the right and the good, are we capable of justifying whatever conclusion we
want? I am arguing that lawyers need to reflect on their own capabilities of
rationalization, to find a way to go beyond reason and rational calculation as a means of
ethical decision-making.
The thread we will follow is the role of reason not just in tying together the bits of
empirical data that create scientific knowledge, but in the effort to see, to rationalize, and
to justify the world as a whole. Even if we no longer engage in theodicy, is it possible
that the same reason that could justify God’s creation of the best of all possible worlds
might also justify our own internal re-creations? I believe the answer is yes, and that skill
in reasoned justification, the forte of the lawyer, is capable of creating just the kind of
troubling gap between the legal and ethical that brought down Nussbaum’s career as a
White House Counsel.
A.

Knowledge and Belief Distinguished

In his Critique of Pure Reason, Kant argued that synthetic a priori knowledge –
knowledge accessible to us only through reason and not experience – was possible. 33
Indeed, his argument was that such a priori knowledge was necessary even for a skeptic
like Hume to pose the question “how do we know?”34 But Kant reached a surprisingly
nuanced conclusion: the only things we can judge to be true are those which, in the first
instance, are the subjects of our experience (or possible experience).35 Knowledge comes
about through the operation of our sensibility – i.e. our perception of objects in the world
– and our understanding – i.e. the way our minds sort and process the objects of our
33

Kant, CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON, supra note 1.
Id., at 146-48 (B20).
35
Id., at 99 (a xvii).
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sensibility.36 The way we perceive that experience is shaped by certain concepts, which
together constitute our understanding that we simply could not have acquired from
experience: unity, causation, substance, plurality and others.37 In short, in the first part
of the Critique of Pure Reason (entitled the “Transcendental Analytic”), Kant deduces
that, subjectively, we are able to order and explain our experience only with an already
ingrained take on the world.38 Moreover, he deduces there is objective knowledge: we
observe a world that can be other than it seems to us, and which exists independently of
our perspective on it.39 Kant rejects the pure idealistic notion that everything happens for
a reason – that there is either a specific or a general Providence knowable to us
objectively.40 But in the world of experience, there is an objective law of causality: as to
empirical events in time and space, everything that happens is bound by cause and
effect.41
Kant tells us that reason is something different than our faculty of understanding
or cognition, which orders the impressions conveyed to us by our sensibility. Reason is
not “a genuine source of concepts and judgments that arise solely from it and thereby
refer it to objects.”42 It is, instead, the faculty by which we derive rules that explain what
we perceive, and the logical conditions underlying those rules. And reason’s goal,
whether or not it is even possible, or tied to empirical reality, is to reach the

36

Id., at 172 (A19/B33).
Kant called these “categories.” Id., at 210-14 (A77/B103).
38
“The form of judgments (transformed into a concept of the synthesis of intuitions) brought forth
categories that direct all use of the understanding in experience.” Id., at 399 (A321/B378).
39
Id., at 219-329 (A84/B116 et seq.)
40
Id., at 116.
41
Id., at 304-05 (B233).
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unconditioned proposition – a process Kant describes as reason’s “vain but confident
treasure hunting.”43
We will often see the terms “constitutive principles” and “regulative principles.”
A statement like: “All molecules are composed of atoms” is a constitutive principle. It is
a proposition that asserts a claim of knowledge, and in this instance, “is a principle of the
possibility of experience and of the empirical cognition of objects of sense.”44 Moreover,
the constitutive principle is a proposition about how the empirical world works, and more
than mere perception of the world, which is the application of our a priori intuitions to
our sense perceptions. The processes by which we may come to constitutive principles
are regulative principles, the rules by which we reason, whether or not that reasoning is
ultimately borne out by correspondence with the real world. “Thus the principle of
reason is only a rule, prescribing a regress in the series of conditions for given
appearances, in which regress it is never allowed to stop with an absolutely
unconditioned.”45
May one’s reason – the regulative principle – lead one to a constitutive claim that
goes beyond what we presently know? Kant says yes, and that should be apparent to
anyone who has ever engaged in speculation ranging from the mundane to the apparent
ability to fathom the mind of God. Application of the regulative principle beyond what
we presently know is certainly something of which our minds are capable: the regulative
principle of reason “is a principle of the greatest possible continuation and extension of
experience, in accordance with which no empirical boundary would hold as an absolute
43

Id., at 398 (A319/B376). For a clear and powerful elucidation of the distinction between the faculty of
cognition and the faculty of reason, which is thinking, see Hannah Arendt, THE LIFE OF THE MIND (1978),
at 53-65.
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boundary; thus it is a principle of reason, which as a rule, postulates what should be
effected by us in the regress, but does not anticipate what is given in the object prior to
any regress.”46 As we will see, this is the basis by which scientific or theoretical reason
allows us to hypothesize what might be versus what we current believe is. But may one’s
reason lead one to a constitutive claim that goes beyond any experience or possible
experience? Kant says no, because of the paradox inherent in the infinite regress.
Indeed, proving the existence of the infinite, the Unconditioned (or God) as a constitutive
principle is the ultimate conflation of constitutive and regulative principles. The use of
reason to propose constitutive principles beyond experience or possible experience is, as
Kant says, “the ascription of objective reality to an idea [i.e. the infinite regress to the
Unconditioned] that merely serves as a rule.”47
B.

Narrowing the Gap

Susan Neiman argues it is the same process of reason that propels us to claims of
knowledge in science, and imperatives of action in morality. 48 Reason is a regulative
process in both instances; reason may lead to constitutive claims only in matters of
experience or possible experience. “Theoretical reason’s success is crucially dependent
on the cooperation of the world. Practical reason, by contrast, can achieve its ends alone.
We do not control the forces of nature, but we do control our wills.” 49
Is scientific inquiry itself wholly objective? The answer is: only as a matter of
degree. It is an illusion to believe that descriptive study is somehow superior to moral
inquiry because the reasoning process is more objective. Scientific inquiry itself swirls

46

Id. (A509/B536).
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around a paradox of reason. Science is the search for knowledge (or constitutive
principles) through reason, but ultimate knowledge – the final Unconditioned proposition
– is impossible to obtain.50 “Reason’s drive to seek the Unconditioned is absolutely
necessary; for it is an analytic proposition that once the conditioned is given, a regress in
the series of all of its conditions is set us as a task. . . .”51 Yet therein lies the paradox or
antinomy, because within the very experience that science seeks to explain, there is no
end to the conditions (“all the way down”).52
But it is reason that supplies the regulative principle that there is an intelligible
world to begin with. “For as we have seen, the knowledge that every event has a cause is
useless without the idea that human reason is capable of tracing the series of causes to a
point at which the events that make up the world become intelligible.”53 The essence of
the paradox is that it is not a necessary conclusion that nature necessarily match up with
reason’s insistence on ultimate intelligibility. “We cannot ensure that nature’s
conclusions – the conditioned given of the experienced world – have adequate grounds in
a series of conclusions that, as a whole, is fully explicable. But reason has a right and a

50

Id., at 64.
Id., at 63.
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need to assume this to be the case.”54 Neiman argues that the drive to science is
teleological, requiring the assumption of order and systematicity.55 Whether or not the
scientist admits it, the process of scientific reason, in presuming intelligibility, presumes
something like a purposive “wise and omnipotent author.”56
Moreover, while the knowledge claims of science are tied to what is confirmable
in the real world, it takes reason’s ability to conceive of what ought to be to posit any
hypothesis that goes beyond mere cognition of the world as it is.57 “The capacity to
demand explanations of experience requires the capacity to go beyond experience, for we
cannot investigate the given until we refuse to take it as given. To ask a question about
some aspect of experience, we must be able to think the thought that it could be
otherwise. Without this thought, we cannot formulate even the vaguest why.”58 Karl
Popper captured the regulative power of reason inherent in the scientist’s conjecture,
noting that “[w]hat the great scientist does is boldly to guess, daringly to conjecture, what
these inner realities are like. This is akin to myth making . . . The boldness can be
gauged by the distance between the world of appearance and the conjectured reality, the

54
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Id., at 82.
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explanatory hypothesis.59 In short, our inquiry into what is, is forever shaped by our
minds’ construction of what ought to be.
How we reason about moral ends is remarkably similar. The unique contribution
of Kant to practical reason was his conclusion that we are capable of reasoning our way
to moral ends (versus the empiricist’s view that ends are solely determined by our desires
or inclinations).60 Reason’s relentless yet ultimately futile drive toward the
Unconditioned – the regulative principle seeking to make constitutive claims – is the
same drive that explains the regulative principles of morality. Here is Kant’s basic
metaphysical distinction: in practical matters, reason is capable of letting us decide what
we ought to do – it makes no claims as to truth or falsity.61 But the claim is stronger than
that: reason is capable of determining moral ends even if those ends are not borne out by
experience.62
The fundamental struggle at the core of being human is between the freedom and
autonomy of the self, on one hand, and inclination and heteronomy of the world of

59

Karl Popper, The problem of demarcation, in Nigel Warburton, ed., PHILOSOPHY: BASIC READINGS
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experience on the other. Neiman writes: “human nature is perpetually torn between its
knowledge of the way the world is and its vision of the way the world ought to be –
between the actual and the possible, the natural and the reasonable.”63 Just as there must
be a priori assumptions about the intelligibility of the universe as a whole in order to ask
questions about possible experience, so must we assume that the moral ends derived by
our reason are attainable, even if we have no guarantees they will be attained.64 The
essence of being human is to be free, to legislate moral ends for oneself, without any
assurance that happiness will be the result of virtue. Even understanding the idea of
freedom itself, like the Unconditioned, is something to which we aspire but never
achieve. “But Reason would overstep all its bounds if it undertook to explain how pure
reason can be practical, which would be exactly the same problem as to explain how
freedom is possible.”65
C.

From Reason to Self-Deception

Kant cautions against overconfidence either about claims of knowledge or claims
of morality. Where the power of our reason causes us to confuse what ought to be with
what is, we have engaged in what Kant calls “transcendental illusion.” In that case,
reason has deceived us by appearing to cast subjective illusions as objective truth.66 If
one misunderstands the principles of pure reason “and takes them to be constitutive
principles of transcendent cognition, then they produce a dazzling but deceptive illusion,
persuasion and imaginary knowledge, and thus also eternal contradictions and
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controversies.”67 The same caution applies when we try to determine whether we have
undertaken any particular action out of moral duty or material inclination. 68 Neiman
writes: “Practical reason, like theoretical reason, has a natural tendency to illusion, which
leads to its misuse in subtle and spurious exercises that we today call rationalizations.”69
The lesson is, therefore: be humbler about the claims of knowledge, because the reason
that derives them is no different than the reason that derives ends. And when we are
humbler about the claims of knowledge, perhaps we might be more confident in the
claims of duty.
There is a substantial and concentrated body of philosophical and psychological
literature on self deception,70 but I want to focus on the question how, when we persuade
ourselves that we know something as a matter of fact or duty to a theoretical or moral
certainty, do we know we are not fooling ourselves? The philosopher David Sanborn
provides an epistemic “why” of rationalization.71 The example is a man who has told
himself his new car is a bargain in order to justify his pleasure in having bought it, and
Sanborn uses it to demonstrate the gap between the irrational pleasure that is honest and a
justifying “thirst for rationality [that] is a major source of lies.”72 These invented reasons
are ostensible, which Sanborn distinguishes from the more paradigmatic view of selfdeception: “The car buyer invents the belief that his new car is a bargain. The lie, which
67
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here has the thirst for rationality as a source, is the second-order belief that one believes
the car to be a bargain. The car-buyer somehow really knows that the car is not a
bargain, but he deceives himself into thinking that it is.”73 In contrast, what makes a
reason ostensible is not that it is necessarily false (indeed, in Sanborn’s example, we are
to suppose that the buyer can in fact demonstrate support for his belief that the car is a
bargain); it is ostensible because the reason is a rationalization to cover for other more
honest reasons (like I just want it!)74 Self-deception may consist not of persuading
oneself that the false is true, or vice versa, or even of holding inconsistent belief. The
very process of rationalization, whereby we adopt anticipating and ostensible beliefs
(versus the honest but perhaps irrational ones), constitutes self-deception.
Sanborn claims there can be no self-deception that is free of rationalization, but
notes his qualms about the role of rationalization in making that very assertion: “Those
who defend theories often provide striking examples of rationalization. Although the
defender of the theory thinks he regards the theory as adequate because he thinks there
are no genuine counterexamples, his treatment of putative counterexamples is actually
heavily biased by his fondness for the theory.”75
Legal scholars have posited at least two answers to the epistemological question:
how do we know whether we are fooling ourselves? One is to give up on epistemology
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altogether. Pragmatists, by and large, reject the inquiry either because they (a) deny the
existence of an external reality accessible only by reason, or (b) if they do not deny it,
they do not believe it has any value in addressing the problems of contingency.76
Others retreat to the apparent objectivity of science. I focus on Judge Posner
(whom I believe has the courage to articulate a philosophy to which others accede but not
publicly), would, I believe, take Kant at his word, claiming that the use of reason in the
pursuit of knowledge or truth is legitimate, but its employment in the pursuit of moral
ends is not. This is borne out in Judge Posner’s own oddly inconsistent treatment (such
as it is) of reason. He clearly grasps (and articulates) a Kantian view of the regulative
nature of reason in science. “Neither logic nor any empirical protocol guarantees truth.
So even scientific knowledge is tentative, revisable – in short, fallible.”77 But Judge
Posner gives more credit to reason’s power than Hume, who denied any ability of a priori
reason in scientific explanation. To Hume, ideas were merely copies of our sense
impressions, and had no utility for explanation of physical events.78 Judge Posner
endorses reason’s power to theorize, but that power is only valid when “it is about
observable phenomena and ‘real’ (physically existing), entities, [and] can be tested by
comparing the predictions generated by the theory with the results of the observations.”79
So far, Judge Posner might well be a Kantian: Kant would agree that the application of
theoretical reason to matters other than experience is an exercise in theodicy, not science.
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Where Judge Posner departs from Kant is in the ability of reason to dictate moral
ends (what he calls “academic moralism”), particularly in contrast to science.80 This hits
at the heart of ethics, and of the conflation of science and morality in the law.
Notwithstanding his concession to the mere regulative power of reason in science, there
is little doubt that Judge Posner (speaking, I think, for many who would not agree with
him on other matters) is endorsing a fundamental distinction between the power to know
through reason and the power to decide through reason what we ought to do. It must
follow, under Judge Posner’s analysis, that theoretical reason in science may allow us to
approach the truth, but practical reason in morality cannot. But we have seen that the
process and structure of reason, as applied to issues of science or morality, are the same.
The difference is the role of nature, and the ability in matters of science whether it
corresponds with reason’s hypotheses.
D.

Legal Discourse as Rationalization

Rationalization of conduct – remaking the “ought” to comport with the “is” – may
well be another description of what lawyers do. But what is the dark side of that process?
We may bias our perception of the “is” of sensibility and understanding by virtue of our
ought-belief. We see the world, or more particularly others, in the way we believe it or
they ought to be. We fail to see malfeasance because we do not believe others are
capable of it, or to see the reality of our own mistakes or failures because we ourselves
ought not to fail or be mistaken. Or we may blame the world or others for the state of
the “is.” We do not change the heteronomous “is” of inclination but justify our
complacency in not acting according to the ought-belief to which reason directs us. In
Sanborn’s car-buyer example, what the buyer knows as the “ought” is that he does not
80
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need the car, but that he might rationalize the “ought” to conform with the “is” of his
material desire. That is, he harmonizes the “is” and the “ought” not by changing the “is”
– overcoming his inclination – but by finding a way to articulate an “ought” consistent
with the inclination.
The moral problem is that we recognize, at some level, consciously or
unconsciously, there is a universal law we would legislate for ourselves: we know we are
engaging in spin. That is, our opponents or the moral issues themselves are obstacles to
the fulfillment of our inclinations and desires. We will justify the “is” of our inclinations
against the “ought” of our duty. This is the justification exercise of reason writ small;
writ large it would involve a complex exercise of legal reasoning to demonstrate why we
were, after all, right. Indeed, we may attribute a malevolent or mistaken ought-belief to
others. We hold our derivation of the “ought” as superior, and attribute bad faith or
malevolence to others when they appear not to concur in it. We simply need consider
Sanborn’s account of the possibility of rationalization and self-deception in theory- or
position- defense. How often do we attribute malevolence to our intellectual opponents,
and they back to us, when we know certainly that we operate only in good faith and in the
pursuit of truth?
I am far more comfortable dealing with my own exercises of self-deception than
ascribing it to someone else, but it strikes me that Bernard Nussbaum’s dilemma from the
outset of the chapter, which combines the “we-they” of politics and the argumentation of
the law, displayed a number of these characteristics. Nussbaum and the Clintons saw the
world legally, and presumed the way they thought the world ought to work was the way it
did work. Rather than concluding perhaps he had done something wrong, Nussbaum
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continued, long after his resignation, to justify what he did.81 It was certainly consistent
with Sanborn’s characterization: we were right, and our opponents were politically
motivated.
In What is Wrong with Self-Deception? Marcia Baron acknowledges the
pervasiveness, indeed, necessity in some instances, of self-deception: “self-deception is,
for most of us, virtually indispensable. And this is the case not merely because there are
episodes in most lives in which we cannot bear to face the truth; it has more to do with
the opacity of self-knowledge.”82 Yet her description of the move from the benign to the
wrong is nuanced, and touches of our exegesis of reason. Knowing ourselves is a
struggle, and sometimes self-knowledge only occurs as a result of the very “instability of
the state of self-deception.”83 Indeed, the role of reason in reconciling the “ought” with
the “is” is at the heart of her defense: “Self-deception is a sort of extension of something
that we all do, and couldn’t but do [ ]: we pick a story, though not just any story, to make
sense out of our lives.”84 Moreover, how self-deception transforms from a benign
exercise to one that is less so is at the heart of my distinction between the process of law
and the process of ethics:
Self-deception’s greatest evils do not lie in deceiving
oneself in the first place, but in refusing to call into
question one’s beliefs (or “stories”), and in struggling to
maintain those beliefs; or in refusing to engage in selfscrutiny, a refusal often conjoined with a tendency not to
notice that what one does or how one lives has profound
and far-reaching effects on others.85
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If rationalization as self-deception has any benign aspect for law, it is that we
have at least created institutions in which the parties may tell a third party the stories they
have created for themselves to justify what they are doing, and often, why, in the case of
conflict one is right and the other is wrong.86 That the rationalization of one’s position
through litigation islegaldoes not mean it is necessarily ethical. The distinction, I
contend, lies in one’s willingness, as individual or business, to call into question the
product of one’s own reason or rationalization: to defeat self-deception.87
E.

Skepticism and Illusions of Certainty

If we accept the Kantian epistemological model, consider how little difference
there is between knowledge and belief, as least as constructed by reason. Reason’s
essence is the derivation of the conditions to any proposition, but reason is not bound by
experience in that process. Moreover, there is a common teleological aspect as between
the application of reason to determining knowledge, and reason’s derivation of moral
ends. Hence, the only real difference between scientific and moral methodology is the
ability to demonstrate that any proposition that is the product of reason can be disproved
by falsifying evidence that is not merely another product of reason. To put it otherwise,
reason’s application of regulative principles – how things ought to be may not match the
reality of the world, but nothing constrains reason’s derivation of what we ought to do.
Whether as a matter of science or a matter of morality, reason’s desire is to reconcile the
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“is” of the world that comes to us through sensibility and understanding and the “ought”
that reason is capable of determining apart from any tie to experience.
Moreover, if we accept a more generalized epistemology of self-deception – that
it is practical reason turning to that “subtle and spurious exercise” of rationalization of the
“ought” and the “is” – then how do we distinguish, if at all, rationalization as selfdeception in the pursuit of science (employing theoretical reason) from that of moral
reasoning (employing practical reason)? What then of a social science discipline, like
many comprehensive approaches to law, that purports to be capable of constitutive claims
of knowledge devoid of any regulative or normative principles? And what of the same
discipline when its practitioners must come to terms with moral ends? Is it possible that
the “is” of comprehension might be conflated with the “ought” of responsibility? And, in
an exercise of epistemic self-deception, that failure to act responsibility might be justified
or rationalized in light of desires or inclinations – whether defense of a theory, or the
obstruction of an investigation, or the need to make the financial targets for the current
quarter?
Particularly in a discipline like law that purports to make claims of descriptive
truth and regulative imperative, to what extent does reason itself cause the conflation of
dogma and belief, on one hand, and science and truth, on the other? Indeed, I am
claiming that well-developed reason is as capable of illusion as it is of insight, Kant’s
transcendental illusion is more the rule than the exception, and that we regularly, in life,
law practice, and academic pursuit, deceive ourselves by mistaking belief for knowledge,
and knowledge for belief.88
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Kant recognized the urge of unrestrained metaphysical meandering as the road to
a dogmatic creed, deceived in its belief that it alone had reached the Unconditioned, but
wholly or partially untethered to experience. I am therefore not particularly surprised that
radical skepticism and dogmatism, as the products of attempts to build or deconstruct
systematic metaphysics (whether so understood or not) continue in the name of social
science. Between the extremes of systematic metaphysics and radical skepticism, our
sensibility of the empirical world is often impacted by reason’s tendency to the
Unconditioned, and our morality directed not to transformation of the social order, but to
justification of the world and ourselves as they are. Nothing exempts the social scientist
from this process.
To be fair, we need to examine the question “why be ethical?” and whether there
is science that might be helpful in answering the question. One of Judge Posner’s great
contributions to this dialogue is that he will say in print what others may believe (or want
to believe) about what is achievable through scientific explanation about human behavior,
but decline, perhaps because the implications are so disturbing. Hence the debate
between rational actor economics and behavioral economics is instructive. Behavioral
economic theorists acknowledge people do not always act in accordance with what seem
to be the assumptions of rational actor theory;89 rational actor theorists respond that by
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trying to explain everything, you end up with a theory of nothing.90 This is not to say that
Judge Posner does not have his own unified theory of behavior: the concept of
“fairness,” for example, “can be made precise, and explained, and subsumed under a
broad conception of rationality, with the aid of the evolutionary biology of positive and
negative altruism.”91
Nevertheless, we still have the problem of science and the “ought.” It is not
surprising that Judge Posner has made that almost imperceptible jump from positive to
normative analysis – the move from “is-is not” to “ought-ought not” – that Hume
questioned. If our theory of the “is” posits rational behavior, and we observe the “is not”
of what appears to be anomalous, then we ought to explain it. Here is Judge Posner’s
description of the thinking process: “Faced with anomalous behavior, the rational-choice
economist, unlike the behavioral economist, doesn't respond, "Of course, what do you
expect?" Troubled, puzzled, challenged, he wracks his brains for some theoretical
extension or modification that will accommodate the seeming anomaly to the assumption
of rationality.”92 Indeed, the notion that we “ought” to explain it, to wrack our brains for
an explanation is another demonstration of the regulative nature of reason at work.
Unless we have a pre-existing idea that people ought to be rational, we would not wrack
our brains to explain the anomaly.
But in the rational-choice theory espoused at least by Judge Posner, “ought” goes
beyond that imbedded in epistemology, and turns quickly to the ends derivable by
practical reason: “One might have thought that behavioral economics had at least one

90

Richard A. Posner, Rational Choice, Behavioral Economics, and the Law, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1551, 1561
(1998):.
91
Id., at 1561.
92
Id., at 1567.

© Jeffrey M. Lipshaw 2006

37

clear normative implication: that efforts should be made through education and perhaps
psychiatry to cure the cognitive quirks and weakness of will that prevent people from
acting rationally with no offsetting gains.”93 In short, by this account, if behavioral
economics teaches us anything positively, it is that all of our flaws (including that
stubborn notion of fairness) are curable by education and psychiatry.
III.

THE MYSTERY OF ETHICAL JUDGMENT
A.

Judging is Different than Knowing

Kant was the first to observe that judging is not the same as knowing.94 It is not
mere application of our faculty of cognition to the real world (i.e. the application of rules
like causality or substance so that we might order our sensible perceptions). Judgment is
instead “the faculty of subsuming under rules, i.e., of determining whether something
stands under a given rule . . . or not.”95 Nor is judgment an exercise in the kind of logic
that constitutes the employment of reason (the derivation of the conditions of
propositions through logic). The attempt to set rules for the application of rules leads to
an infinite regress. If you try to determine what circumstances fit within a rule, setting
another rule merely leads to another rule to another rule to another rule, all the way down.
Hence, according to Kant, “the power of judgment is a special talent that cannot be taught
but only practiced.” 96
Hence, there is no rule for the application of a rule. Indeed, if Kant captured
anything in the interplay between rules and examples, it is the battle that law professors
undertake with their first year students. In the hoary law school test-taking methodology
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of IRAC (“issue-rule-application-conclusion”), the real exercise of judgment is the A of
application, not the mere memorization of rules. It is as though, seeking to derive
through the power of logic a universal statement of a rule, the law student falls into
precisely the errors Kant anticipates. The student may have all the hornbook and study
aid rules memorized, “yet can easily stumble in their application, either because he is
lacking in natural power of judgment (though not in understanding), and to be sure
understands the universal in abstracto but cannot distinguish whether a case belongs in
concreto under it has not received adequate training for this judgment through examples
and actual business.”97
There is, moreover, a difference between the kind of judgment (namely, pattern
finding in experience) we undertake in science, and the kind of judgment we make when
we decide that a particular circumstance falls within a more general legal, moral or
ethical rule. Where the general is given, the process by which we determine that a
particular instance falls under it is called “determinant” judgment.98 Where the particular
is given and the universal rule must be found, the judgment is called “reflective
judgment.” 99 Kant appreciates the power of the inference of ends to inanimate nature:
even though nature gives us no reason to believe that its various components relate to
each other as means to ends, the very inference of causality implies an order we can
never prove.100 There is no necessity to nature other than our ordering brings to it:
“nature, regarded as mere mechanism, could have fashioned itself in a thousand other
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different ways without lighting precisely on the unity based on a principle like this, and . .
. accordingly, it is only outside the conception of nature, and not in it, that we may hope
to find some shadow of ground a priori for that unity.”101 Kant stresses that this inference
of ends (“teleology”) is by analogy only. We are merely engaged in deriving, through
use of reflective judgment, those laws that appear to govern an objective, yet blindly
operating, world. Suggesting there really is a conscious design to nature “would mean
that teleology is based, not merely on a regulative principle, directed to the simple
estimate of phenomena, but is actually based on a constitutive principle available for
deriving natural products from their causes; with the result that the concept of an end of
nature now exists for the determinant, rather than the reflective judgment.”102
In short, the reflective judgment is the usual process of induction tied to
experience. It goes beyond what we can know to say that the rule that we have derived
by induction from experience truly is – shall we say it? – an intelligent design – one with
conscious purpose and ends in mind (i.e. a “constitutive” principle or one of real
knowledge). Determinant judgment is even more slippery. It is an exercise by which we
now attach a particular example to the general rule. Our reason has conceived of an
order, an end, a system into which this example falls, but nature is random and fortuitous,
and it may not turn out that way. To suggest we can both know and not know an end in
nature is obviously a contradiction, and the answer is we cannot know. Thus, Kant
distinguishes the more speculative essence of the determinant judgment from the
reflective judgment. The moment of judgment – the sense of fit to an end – “is
transcendent for the determinant judgment if its object is viewed by reason – albeit for
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the reflective judgment [inferring a pattern from events] it may be immanent in respect of
objects of experience.”103 As Professor Linda Meyer notes, “The key step, the perception
of relevance, is not predetermined by the rule. That perception of relevance is driven by a
deeper sense of "fit" or "sense of fairness" that is not reducible to rules and remains in the
background, expressible only through metaphor or analogy, tangible only in connection
with concrete examples. We point to fit or sense, but we cannot give a rule for it.”104
B.

Distinguishing Legal Rules and Ethical Standards

To judge we need a rule to apply. But let us first distinguish the rules of law and
the rules of ethics. In the process by which we reason our way to legal conclusions in
matters of private law, we might, but are never required to, ask the question “what
ought?” as a matter of universal application. Certainly in the realm of public law, this
statement might be construed as inviting a debate along the well-trod lines of Hart, Fuller,
Raz and Dworkin: does law, to be considered law, incorporate some kind of moral base
line, or is it merely the positive law? But when I am faced with a moral dilemma in a
matter that, if resolved by law at all is a matter of private law, we go outside of what is
merely legal. While the law may have a significant bearing on my decision (because I
place a value on adherence to law), the determination what the law requires may differ
significantly from the decision what I ought to do.
Regardless of one’s position on the positivist-naturalist debate, it seems to me
hard to deny this bit of legal realism: at least in matters of private law, the statement of
the applicable law in a particular instance is the result of someone’s exercise of
determinant judgment. Indeed, whether we look at the positions of the parties or the
103
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ruling by the court, the argumentation of law is one in which we look at what is or has
been, and by the exercise of determinant judgment, decide whether the general rules of
legal entitlement govern the particular instance. What have we accomplished in that
exercise? We have taken the general rule of legal entitlement in that instance as a
surrogate for what ought to be and shown how it governs what has happened or what will
happen. Most lawyers will work their entire careers without reflecting for a moment on
the philosophical essence of law, but very few will pass even a day without exercising
determinant judgment about what the law in a particular circumstance is.
But there is no rule for the application of a rule. So the process of determinant
judgment must be influenced by something outside the rule itself. When we find
ourselves in a circumstance of business decision or business conflict, it is entirely
possible we are influenced by the desire to find a universal statement of “what ought.”
But when we consider the application of the legal rules (the general principles) to the
circumstances (the particular) example, I suspect we are more likely influenced by our
own instrumental and consequential ends. Indeed, the process of law when directed at
the redemption of our particular wants and needs is a process, above all, of justification.
We will justify those ends by making arguments that says this particular rule ought to
govern, but that is simply another way of saying what the law in the particular
circumstance is.105 Put another way (reflecting Kelsen’s Pure Theory of Law), the
process of legal argumentation is simply the identification of the legal consequence that
flows from a particular set of facts. That, and nothing else, is the positive law.
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But having reached, even provisionally, a determination of the positive law (i.e.
the legal “ought” in Kelsen’s terms that constitutes the positive law), there is still the
question “what ought” by appeal to a universal moral standard that may or may not match
the legal “ought.” Within the legal academy we have one school suggesting scientific
methodology gives us the optimum general rules through the process of induction (“we
have determined that we are all better off when we adopt legal rules that maximize
welfare over those concerned with fairness”), and another that claims there to be a single
right answer (determinable through the exercise of reason) to every hard question of the
“ought.” Neither approach tells us how to decide in the moment of judgment. Indeed,
the dangers in that moment are polarities of transcendental illusion: the subtle and
spurious rationalizations of which reason is capable either in the name of science, at one
pole, or morality, at the other.
There is a moment of judgment, in which no rule, no logic, no showing of the
predictive power of a particular economic model can tell us what to do. In science,
theoretical reason acts as a regulative mechanism pushing us, untethered to experience, to
predictions of what will be, and what makes it science is its tie to experience or possible
experience. We can never reach the Unconditioned, even in knowledge, but we can
approach it, and theoretical reason may be trumped (i.e. falsified) by experience. In
morality, practical reason drives us to what ought to be, and we are able to reason to ends
by deciding whether the principles governing our action are universals – ones we would
have apply to anybody in this circumstance. In either case, I am concerned about the
thirst for rationality that creates lies, and the assertion of ostensible reasons for an act we
ought or ought not to undertake. As an ex antesource to which we might turn in deciding
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what to do, law only answers to the question “what are we entitled to do?” Ex post, it is
primary a means for justifying what we did by reference to what we were entitled to do.
In making judgment about actions, we need to separate the questions of “what is” from
“what ought,” and do so without conflating the two.
C.

Finding an Ethical Standard

The real problem of reflection on ethics is that it invokes a philosophical
dilemma: how do we make judgments reconciling the right and the good? If doing right
– being virtuous, or abiding our duties – always coincided with an increase in happiness –
the amount of good in the world – there would be no problem. Whether they realize it or
not, business managers confront this issue all the time. For example, most contemporary
businesses would say that they are concerned not just with financial or operating
performance but with values. Indeed, if performance – the accomplishment of the good –
and values – the accomplishment of the right – are placed on horizontal and vertical axes,
the dilemma is not dealing with the coincidence of the right and the good, but the
troubling state of affairs when they do not match. Regardless how he operated in
practice, Jack Welch, the former chairman and chief executive officer of General
Electric, claimed that there was no place in the organization for the executive who
accomplished the good but not the right.106
Ethical decision-making would be less troubling if every case of incongruity
between the right and the good were at the extremes. In an ideal world, the wrongs
would be so clear that any resort to justification by the good would be irrelevant. The
real world is not so accommodating. Consider the following hypothetical:
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The company has two valuable and high-potential employees, Jack and
Stephanie. They are managing the critical launch of the company’s
newest product, one upon which the future of the company rides.
An internal audit reveals that the two have been using Jack’s company
credit card to purchase personal items that have no conceivable
connection to the company (a new DVD recorder, for example).. The
human resources manager confronts Jack, who admits that his personal
finances had gotten out of control, that it was a bad mistake, but he was
desperate, and at some point, intended to repay it. Jack says that he told
Stephanie what he was doing, learned that she also was in bad financial
straits, and lent the card to her. Jack is terminated for cause
immediately and escorted out of the building, and does not contest the
termination.
The human resources manager then confronts Stephanie. Stephanie first
admits that she used the card, then claims later that she did not, and that
Jack purchased the items for her, without her knowing the source of the
funds. Over the next two days, as the manager investigates the situation,
Stephanie consults with a lawyer, who insists that the company does not
have a basis for a termination with cause. In order to get the matter
behind him, the manager agrees that Stephanie will be allowed to sign a
routine separation agreement and mutual release, and to receive two
weeks’ severance pay, half of the amount to which she would have been
entitled under the company policy.
Friends of Jack complain that concessions made to Stephanie are not
right, and that there has been unfair and unequal treatment of the two:
if Jack was terminated for cause, Stephanie should have been as well.
Was it wrong, or even unethical, for the human resources manager to have treated
Jack and Stephanie differently, merely because Stephanie “lawyered up?” When we are
trying to decide in the context of business ethics what we ought to do, we have two
problems. First, what is the ultimate aim of our deliberation? Is our task to determine a
duty and to act in accordance with it? Was it the manager’s obligation to determine his
duty (I suppose, in this case, of justice) and to do what is right regardless of the
consequence (e.g. the drain on his time by fighting the termination with cause issue with
Stephanie)? Or are we obliged to determine the good or bad that will be the consequence
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of our decision, and choose on that basis? In that instance, is it permissible to conclude
that Jack, notwithstanding his serious violation of the rules, is a valuable employee and
the ultimate good in his contribution to the success of the company outweighs the need
for discipline?
All of this falls under the rubric of practical reason, the method by which we go
about making decisions not about whether something is true or false, but about what we
ought to do. In Aristotle’s practical reason, we look for and act on those virtues that are
the mean between polar values; in Kant’s deontological practical reason, in which we
derive broad and immutable duties prescribed by the moral law and follow their dictates
regardless of consequences; in utilitarian ethics we deny there is any “right” other than
the “good” and view the issue only in terms of maximizing whatever is good in actual
experience.
Even if we agree on the standard by which to make the ethical decision, what is
the decision-making methodology? How do you go about, on a day-to-day basis,
deciding whether duty prevails over consequence? We have explored the errors possible
when we reason our way from broad statement of what is right or what is good. For
example, even though Kant tells us, in principle, our duties under the moral law are
determinable by the exercise of practical reason, consider the distance between theory
and practice. First, our duty is our ultimate freedom from the pulls, inclinations, and
desires of the physical world. When we determine our duty as the rule we would make
universal in that circumstance, we have determined good for its own sake, not for any
instrumental reason. But, Kant concedes, we cannot explain how freedom is possible
without circularity or antinomy. Second, we cannot be sure that our determination
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emanates from practical reason and duty or from some underlying inclination. Third,
there is always the possibility of transcendental illusion. We mistake the universality of
the practical rule for a statement of epistemological truth. That is the road by which
reason can lead to rationalization which in turn may constitute self-deception.
“I know it when I see it.” We can never quite get to “it” but “it” somehow,
nevertheless, manages to inform our decisions. “It” does seem to say that we manage to
apply basic notions of things like fairness or justice or mercy, even if we cannot always
articulate precisely how we are doing it. In the face of a hard decision, “we sleep on it.”
We do not make progress in sorting through conflicting values by more thought, as much
as by isolating that one bothersome tickle at the innermost core of our concern.
Various ethical traditions have tried to make the “it” more concrete without
suggesting there is an algorithm by which we might calculate the correct decision. There
is a real appeal to virtue ethics. The Aristotelian notion of the golden mean pulsates with
common sense. But, for the actor making the decision, virtue ethics beg the question. In
a way (and not surprisingly having been first articulated by Aristotle) virtue ethics are the
product of inductive through reflective judgment. Looking back at all the data, the best
decisions tend to have been made by virtuous people. So we are best off having virtuous
people continue to make our critical judgments.107
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I do not mean to give short shrift to virtue ethics and virtue jurisprudence. The classic modern defense
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Philosophy, in A.Martinich & David Sosa, ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY: AN ANTHOLOGY (2001), at 381-92.
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Similarly, modern natural law theory may strike some as an unsatisfying basis for
ethics not because there is anything particularly troubling with the behavior its theorists
advocate (unlike the normative implications of rational choice or behavioral economic
theory). The real problem is the answer “because I said so” in the modern sensibility.
Moreover, natural law presumes, fundamentally, a linkage between the right and the
good, that virtue leads to happiness, and that is simply too much for the modern
sensibility. It is far less satisfying, epistemologically, to come to terms with the idea that
we simply must live with the questions rather than the answers, but I think that is at least
an intellectually honest answer that resonates with thoughtful people.
1.

Appeal to Natural Law

If you already adhere to a particular body of, or approach to, religious or natural
law, it is not hard to be influenced by specific dictates given authoritatively by
representatives of that body of thinking, whether the church or Ronald Dworkin. Here is
the conundrum: despite my conviction there are universalities available to me by
intuition, I continue to rebel at religious or natural law dictates. And I ask myself “why?”
The first thing we need to do is clarify what we mean by natural law. As Brian
Bix points out, we use natural law to describe two separate modes of thought. The first is
the traditional view: that natural law is something “higher” than mere positive law, is
just, true, unchanging over time and universal, and is accessible by human reason.108 The
second is the “modern” view (although it would be incorrect to suggest, as I will discuss,
that the traditional view has no modern adherents). Modern natural law theorists deny
Robert Audi’s critique of virtue ethics resonates with me: “many morally reflective people . . . find that
determining what conduct is virtuous requires going beyond virtue ethics and appealing to principles or
standards not clearly implicit in any pure virtue ethics.” Robert Audi, THE GOOD IN THE RIGHT (2005), at
197.
108
Bix, Natural Law Theory, supra note , at 224.
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the positivist claim that there is a necessary separation between law and morality. I will
focus particularly on Ronald Dworkin because of the clarity of his claim that the process
by which judges fit their present decisions to previous cases, and justify the present
decision within acceptance moral boundaries.109 In either case, I want to wrestle with
what seems to me to be the blocking issue: not just that we talk about answers to hard
moral and legal cases as if there were an single answer already determined by some
omniscient Author and merely discoverable by efforts of reason, but the conclusion there
is such a single answer.
I believe the fair approach is to consider the most articulate contemporary
discussions of traditional and modern natural law, and to determine how far I may travel
along the paths they suggest, and where I turn away. So let us turn briefly to them.
a.

Modern Natural Law and the Single Right Answer

The most articulate advocate of “modern” natural law is Ronald Dworkin. In
Objectivity and Truth: You Better Believe It,110 and in a more recent sequel available
online,111 Dworkin addresses the modern skepticism toward truth, morality and
responsibility. I know I am not the kind of post-modern skeptic Dworkin derides in
Objectivity, but I was not sure as I read the article whether Dworkin would agree.
The issue, from the first paragraph, is whether there is any objective truth about
anything. Are our most “confident convictions about what happened in the past or what
the universe is made of or who we are or what is beautiful or who is wicked” mere
conventions? Do we deceive ourselves into thinking we have discovered “some external,
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Id., at 234-37.
Ronald Dworkin, Objectivity and Truth: You Better Believe It, 25 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 87 (1996).
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Ronald Dworkin, Truth and Responsibility and Morality as Interpretation, available at
http://www.law.nyu.edu/ clppt/program2005/readings/Hedgehogs_2and4.pdf.
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objective, timeless, mind-independent world” or are all of our most universal moral truths
things “we have actually invented ourselves, out of instinct, imagination and culture?”112
Dworkin’s answer (and it is consistent with his theory of the law spelled out in Law’s
Empire113) is that there are objective moral truths, but inquiry into the metaphysics from
which they might derive is a waste of time.
Dworkin uses hot button issues like genocide or abortion, but I prefer to think in
more mundane, yet equally troubling examples. A chemical company needs to make a
decision about the continued sale of a chemical flame retardant product used in furniture
and mattress foam. The balance is between a significant positive – lives saved or
debilitating burns avoided by the use of the chemical – and a potential negative - there is
also evidence that the chemical is accumulating in human fat tissue, with no present
evidence that accumulation has a toxic effect on humans.
Dworkin distinguishes what he terms “internal skepticism” from “external
skepticism.” Internal skepticism is an attitude to which we are entitled if we are engaged
in making moral decisions. Dworkin views the skepticism as “internal” because the
skeptic acknowledges some moral decisions are right and some are wrong, some are
better and some are worse; the internal skeptic plays within the game of moral judgment,
but is not skeptical as to the very possibility of moral judgment at all.114 “An internally
skeptical position, then, denies some group of familiar positive claims and justifies that
denial by endorsing a different positive moral claim – perhaps a more general or
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Dworkin, Objectivity, supra note , at 87.
Ronald Dworkin, LAW’S EMPIRE (1986).
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In Law’s Empire, Dworkin makes this distinction as to the question of interpretation: an internal skeptic
may be skeptical of an interpretive conclusion, but does not question the validity of making any
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counterfactual or theoretical one.”115 In the instance of the flame retardant, we may
believe we have reached the right answer by resolving the situation in favor of continuing
to manufacture and save present lives, but others are entitled to be skeptical of the
conclusion because they hold a contrary view of morality.
Nevertheless, Dworkin would insist there is a single right answer to the issue,
even if we are uncertain what it is. Here Dworkin distinguishes between uncertainty,
which he holds to be a valid, if weaker, position than either a positive or negative view on
an issue, and indeterminacy, which he rejects as a valid philosophical position.
Indeterminacy, in turn, is of two kinds. It is first person if you decide that because you
cannot make up your mind, there is no determinable right answer. It is third person, if
observing a dispute between others, you conclude that it is simply not possible to
determine who has the better of the argument. So while Dworkin may change his mind
on abortion, for example, depending on his mood or the argument, and I may go back and
forth on the flame retardant issue, that merely means we are uncertain about the right
answer, not that there is no determinable right answer.116
To get to Dworkin’s ultimate claim about the objective truth of “moral facts,” we
still to work through what Dworkin calls “external skepticism.” External skepticism is
not a moral position, but a metaphysical one: it rejects the belief “that one interpretation
of some text or social practice can be on balance better than others, that there can be a
‘right answer’ to the question which is best even when it is controversial what the right
answer is.”117 Dworkin coins the phrase “archimedean” to despite external skeptics:
“they purport to stand outside a whole body of belief, and to judge it as a whole from
115

Id., at 90.
Id., at 129-31.
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premises or attitudes that owe nothing to it.”118 It is important to understand what
Dworkin is rebutting. It is not the radical skepticism who says we have no basis for
making any moral judgments at all. In a paraphrase of the “liar paradox” inherent in the
statement “there is no truth” (i.e. if the statement is true, then the statement itself must be
false), Dworkin disposes quickly of this radical skepticism all the way down.119 The
more difficult issue is that of the so-called selective archimedean, who believes firstorder moral propositions like “abortion is wicked” or “genocide is wrong” but is skeptical
of any metaphysical basis on which one might contend those first-order propositions are
objectively true.120 So a selective archimedean might agree that genocide is wrong but
deny the truth of the second-order statement “it is always and objectively the case that
genocide is wrong.” This is primarily a response to post-moderns, who assert rightness
or wrongness in specific contexts, but deny any basis for saying, ultimately, that one may
make objective judgments about right and wrong.
Dworkin’s technique is to collapse the first-order and second-order propositions
together, contending that the second-order proposition is meaningless, because any moral
proposition itself makes a claim that it is an objective truth. He does not really seek to
refute the skeptical response to the second-order proposition, as much as simply to
announce an alternative: morality is so deeply imbued in our experience of the real
world, we ought to just accept it as a thing in itself, and disdain further metaphysics. 121
In the follow-on chapter to Objectivity (posted on the NYU Colloquium),
Dworkin is consistent in seeing moral propositions either as, or akin to, objective facts.
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He proposes a “quotidian” view of meta-ethics and moral theory, one insisting “that the
traditional questions of moral philosophy, including the question whether moral values
are real and whether people can achieve moral knowledge, are intelligible and can be
answered only if we understand them as ordinary, everyday substantive moral
questions.”122 He offers an involved epistemology of morality, including a comparison
scientific reasoning to moral reasoning, all of which seems to assume ab initio that there
are “moral facts” but they may not have the same “causal relationships” as scientific
facts. All of this seems to work off of the assumption (and one I have previously
addressed) that noumena are knowable as truth.123 If it there is an objective truth, we
may be uncertain about it, but it does not negate its existence.
b.

Contemporary Application of Traditional Natural Law

My casual empiricism leads me to conclude that the introduction of metaphysics
into contemporary consideration of law and ethics within the legal academy is largely the
province of writers who are willing to engage in public reconciliation of deeply-held
religious beliefs and the scholarship of the law. One will find, for example, a significant
body of Catholic reaction to issues, for example, of law and economics,124 corporate
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CATH. LEGAL STUD. 35, 37 (2005):
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law,125 or the matter of justice generally.126 There are arguments, based in Jewish
tradition, that the law must have some fundamental and universal source, beyond merely
the expression of human beings.127 There are reconciliations of contract law and
Christian conscience based in Mormon theology.128 There is an initial and obvious
answer to the attempt to use religion or traditional natural law as the basis for a set of
business ethics: whether or not the doctrine states universal principles or claims to be
universal (and remember that catholic means universal), we grow up sectarian. I respect
your right to believe, and even the belief itself, but I do not believe it.129
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Susan J. Stabile, A Catholic Vision of the Corporation, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=761605
(2005): 40 (footnotes omitted):
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encyclicals and other documents over the years, than do other religions.
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If there is any scholar, however, whose attempt to grapple with traditional natural
law in a contemporary setting might appeal to the secular seeker, it is Professor Steven D.
Smith. His book Law’s Quandary130 asks if we all are now legal positivists and realists,
believing that the law is what the judge says it is, based on all the predilections,
prejudices, mores, and standards prevalent at the time of the decision, then why do we
continue to speak of the law as though it were something that existed before the onset of
the present dispute, and which must, upon discovery through argument and application,
inexorably apply to the present matter? What is particularly appealing about Professor
Smith’s approach is that, while he is clearly a devoted Christian, his humility and
openness to the intellectual struggle shine through. His essay, Hollow Men: Law and the
Declension of Belief, is as forthright and articulate defense of the contemporary vitality of
belief itself, if not belief in a traditional natural law.131
I will briefly reconstruct Smith’s argument, but in a slightly different order than
he presents it. Unlike reasoning, or emotion, or sociability, all of which human beings
share with other species or beings, human uniquely have the capability to believe.
Indeed, Smith argues, what makes us uniquely human is our capacity to believe, which
itself reflects our “our distinctive relation to truth – not just truth in the sense of mundane
fact . . . but to Truth in the upper case.”132 Given this predicate, loss of belief or an
inability to believe makes us less human – hollower, as it were. Like Korsgaard, Smith
sees the decline of belief in the modern age largely as the result of the predominance of

rediscover those human and moral truths that flow from the nature of the human person and that safeguard
human freedom.” Mission Statement, available at
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the naturalistic or scientific world view. If no theory in science is ever final (as we have
seen), then suggesting anything is final or eternal is subject to question, leaving us with a
belief system anchored in doubt.
Smith posits four reactions to the challenge to constitutive religious or natural law
belief claims: apologetics, abandonment, self-deception, or the most significant, the
declension of belief itself (sort of a “lowered expectations” strategy to the whole idea of
belief). The declension strategy Smith assesses is the “pragmatic turn:” to the extent
belief or the idea of Truth are useful to us, there is some reason for them to exist. He
concludes the strategy is ultimately self-contradictory. The value of faith is in its
intrinsic not its instrumental value. Believing something merely because it is useful to
believe it (and not because it is true) “necessarily involves the believer – or the halfbeliever – in self-deception, or at least in a sort of Orwellian double-think.”133 I think the
point Smith wants to make in Law’s Quandary, which he repeats and enhances in Hollow
Men, is that the reason for our talk of the law, even in an age of legal positivism and
realism, as though it were natural law is that there is a transcendent Author, God, who
writes the natural law. Yet he expresses a vision for Christian jurisprudence – that this
element of the law that seems to presuppose an ascertainable Truth is an avenue by which
“we may glimpse ‘the dearest freshness deep down things.’”134
I think Smith’s claims, ironically, though based in more traditional natural law are
humbler, and therefore more revealing than Dworkin’s. What Smith identifies is the
apparent paradox of our continuing need to believe (and the logical next step, that there is

133
134

Id., at 15.
Id., at 30.

© Jeffrey M. Lipshaw 2006

56

a Truth in which we may believe) in an age when belief no longer suffices as a means of
explanation, and the idea of Truth is at best difficult.135
Is it possible to articulate a secular transcendentalism, an acknowledgment of
mystery that takes one to the edge of belief, but not to the more concrete faith of a
Christian? I think that is the natural import of reason’s regulative practices: we propose
order and purpose because, well, we just propose order and purpose. I agree with
Dworkin that we cannot stand outside of reason to understand reason. Indeed, I return
once again to Kant’s wisdom on this subject. That we presume a God because of “the
dearest freshest deep down things” or perceive that the world is “charged with the
grandeur of God” is the basis for the argument from design, the proof of God Kant said
“always deserves to be named with respect.”136 But our presumptions about God or
Truth need to remain, it seems to me, beliefs, and hence I will continue to recoil
whenever someone tells me, as though it were Truth, what God is thinking or God wants
or God does as though the person just finished an in-depth conversation with God (or
nowadays, I suppose, received a message on his Blackberry). Kant recognized that even
though we can, and indeed, must presuppose a “unique wise and all-powerful world
author,” we have nevertheless not extended our cognition beyond the field of possible
experience “[f]or we have only presupposed a Something, of which we have no concept
at all of what it is in itself (a merely transcendental object). . . .”137 Kant anticipates the
seeker who asks, “Yet may I regard purpose-like orderings as intentions by deriving them
from the divine will, though of course mediately through dispositions toward them set up
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in the world?”138 The answ
er is yes, you can, but you can never know that is the case:
“where you do perceive purposive unity, it must not matter at all whether you say, “God
has wisely willed it so” or “Nature has wisely so ordered it.”139 I ask again: “but may I
say that I know this ordering to be true as a matter of God’s law or universal natural
law?” And while Kant acknowledges my continuing aim “to seek out the necessary and
greatest possible unity of nature,” even “to have the idea of a highest being to thank for
this so far as we can reach it,” the answer is no. 140 Whether it is Dworkin’s voice or the
voice of a prophet claiming to be the intermediary with natural or God’s law, and as
much as I agree that belief is hardwired into us, and makes us human, I cannot accept the
intermediate’s articulation of the dictates of either law as Truth.
I will return to Martin Buber in far more detail in the next section, but I think his
insight on our ability to dictate, much less teach, rules as the source of ethics is helpful.
Buber talks about the education of character, and considers the impact of teaching moral
rules as though they were equivalent to the axioms of algebra. He may explain that envy,
or bullying, or lying are wrong, and the reaction from his students tells him: “I have
made the fatal mistake of giving instruction in ethics, and what I said is accepted as
current coin of knowledge; nothing of it is transformed into character-building
substance.”141 But he observed:
After all, pupils do want, for the most part, to learn
something, even if not overmuch, so that a tacit agreement
becomes possible. But as soon as my pupils notice that I
want to educate their characters I am resisted precisely by
those who show most signs of genuine independent
character: they will not let themselves be educated, or
138
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rather, they do not like the idea that somebody wants to
educate them. And those, too, who are seriously laboring
over the question of good and evil, rebel when one dictates
to them, as though it were some long established truth,
what is good and what is bad; again how hard it is to find
the right way.142
I think Buber is onto something universal: we understand intuitively how hard it is to
make good judgments, and that there is no rule for the application of a rule. Like the
scientist creating the hypothesis as a product of reflective judgment, and not the mass of
underlying data, or the judge, as a matter of determinant judgment, deciding that this case
is a particular example of a general rule, we know the right decisions are too nuanced to
be dictated to us. In either case, traditional or modern natural law, what I think drives
thoughtful people to skepticism or pragmatism is the implausibility of the single answer.
2.

The Promise of Intuitionism
a.

The Right versus the Good

Nevertheless, I have a strong sense of right and wrong. Calling it a sense of right
and wrong implies the very objectivity and truth that underlies natural and religious law.
How then do we make our way through all the apparent paradox? As free rational agents
we legislate to ourselves, but are restrained by norms. We acknowledge the general rules
of law, but the need for the exceptions of equity. We acknowledge that the capacity to
believe makes us human, but rebel against the claim that belief equates to truth or
knowledge. We see the power of reason in allowing us to conceive, in science and
morality, the possibility of what ought to be, unconstrained by what is, and yet
understand the power of reason to drag into transcendental illusion, rationalization,
dogmatism, and self-deception.
142

Id., at 124-25.

© Jeffrey M. Lipshaw 2006

59

If there is any common theme regardless of the standard by which we make the
judgment, it is that we so often turn not just to the product of reason and reflection, but to
an intuitive sense. Even Richard Posner, who espouses a pragmatic skepticism that
denies moral universals, nevertheless appeals to an intuitive practical reason as the basis
for deciding cases: “anecdote, introspection, imagination, common sense, intuition (due
apparently to how the brain structures perceptions, so that, for example, we ascribe causal
significance to acts without being able to observe -- we never do observe -- causality),
empathy, imputation of motives, speaker's authority, metaphor, analogy, precedent,
custom, memory, "induction" (the expectation of regularities, related both to intuition and
to analogy), ‘experience.’”143
G.E. Moore began a century-long debate over the idea of “intuitionism,” an
ethical philosophy that addresses the difficulty of bringing broader principles down to
specific instances, either as a matter of utilitarianism or consequentialism (which focus
on the maximization of the good and the minimization of the bad) or deontology with its
array of conflicting duties that constitute the “right.” 144 W.D. Ross rejected Moore’s
consequentialism, arguing that the aim of ethics is not necessarily the good, but doing
what is right, and disagreed with Moore’s claim that the ultimate “right” was doing that
which increased the good. Ross’s intuitionism was based in a list of prima facie duties:
fidelity, reparation, justice, gratitude, beneficence, self-improvement and non-injury.145
The duties are prima facie because each indicates a moral reason for action, but the act
may not reflect our final duty because of competing duties that might override the first.146
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An example is the person who breaks a promise (the duty of fidelity to one’s word) to
meet a friend for breakfast because her child is ill and needs attention (the duty of noninjury).147 “The central idea underlying the Rossian notion of a prima facie duty is that of
a duty which is – given the presence of its ground – ineradicable but overridable.”148
It seems to me Ross’s contribution to intuitionism is two-fold. First, there is the
deontological intuition itself – that, contrary to Moore’s contention, it just cannot be that
the right means only that which produces the good in a utilitarian sense. We will
obviously never resolve the issue, but Ross’s appeal to a common sense that we perceive
duties not necessarily co-extensive with their consequences is at least as compelling as
Judge Posner’s opposing view. Note the emphasis: “we have to ask ourselves whether
we really, when we reflect, are convinced that this is self-evident, and whether we really
can get rid of our view that promise-keeping [as one example of a prima facie duty] has a
bindingness independent of the productiveness of maximum good. In my own
experience I find that I cannot, in spite of a very genuine attempt to do so; and I venture
to think that most people will find the same. . . .”149
Second, Ross, it seems to me, more directly addresses the process by which we
decide among all the conflicting parameters than the utilitarians, and does so in a way
that is consistent with what we have observed about judgment. Ross asks why, if we are
permitted to weigh all of the consequences of an act, we should not also be able to weigh
the prima facie duties before coming to a conclusion about our actual duty.150 Moreover,
whether we were to weigh duties or consequences (even knowing beforehand the extent
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of the good or bad consequences), “there is no principle by which we can draw the
conclusion that it is on the whole right or on the whole wrong.”151 Indeed, though not
expressly, it is clear Ross draws on the Kantian exposition of judgment: “the judgement
as to the rightness of a particular act is just like the judgement as to the beauty of a
particular natural object or a work of art.” Judgment of right and wrong is not simple
calculation (there is no rule for the application of a rule); “both in [the case of beauty]
and in the moral case we have more or less probable opinions which are not logically
justified conclusions from the general principles that are recognized as self-evident.”152
Robert Audihas recently sought to re invigorate a Rossian intuitionism that is
reflective and flexible.153 That is, intuitions are non-inferential – we simply come to
know or to believe – but intuitions are fallible (they may be wrong), defeasible (one can
come to see they are wrong by circumstances or another intuition), provide an irreducible
plurality of basic moral principles which associate with different grounds for duty.154
Audi’s intuitionism is Kantian, however, in its approach to conflicting duties. 155 Ross’s
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meta-theory held that all prima facie duties were accorded equal weight, and the
determination of overriding duties was a matter of practical wisdom and rules of
thumb.156 If not adopting all of Kant’s moral philosophy, Audi takes the view that the
Rossian duties might nevertheless be systematized by over-arching moral theory.157 Audi
chooses, if not all of Kant’s own ramifications, the universality and intrinsic ends
formulations of the Categorical Imperative.158 Finally, Audi moderates Rossian
intuitionism not only with defeasibility of the intuition of duties, but something that is
expressly non-deontological: consideration of intrinsic value, the good or bad that may
be the consequences of the action.159 Again, Audi position is grounded in what to a nonphilosopher (or perhaps to an Aristotelian) would seem like ordinary good sense: there
must be some way to incorporate the notions of human flourishing – good or bad
consequences – at the same time we consider our duties.160
b.

Intuitionism Distinguished

Of course, the objection to intuitionism is obvious. If we have conflicting
intuitions, how is my intuition any different from your natural law or religious dogma?
What makes mine right and yours wrong? I do not know. I do, however, find myself
moved by a concept of defeasible intuitionism, one that acknowledges the mystery at the
core of these issues, and provides a basis for constructive and inferential dialogue about

156

Audi, THE GOOD IN THE RIGHT, supra note , at 92-93.
Id., at 83.
158
Id., at 90-94.
159
Id., at 121-38.
160
Id., at 159.
The intrinsically good and the intrinsically bad kinds of things in
question can be non-inferentially and intuitively known to be good or to
be bad, as some of the principles that reflect them can be noninferentially and intuitively known to be true. And, without the burden
of having to maximize any value, moral agents can see themselves as
realizing the good in fulfilling their obligations.
157

© Jeffrey M. Lipshaw 2006

63

the “ought.” That, however, leads us to the most difficult concept of all: how we might
go about finding grounds to defeat what comes to us intuitively, to sort through what is
merely suppressed (or not-so-suppressed) desire or inclination, what may be the
transcendental illusion of dogmatism, and what may truly be an intuition of ethical
rightness, fairness or justice.
The appeal of moderate intuitionism is its very reasonableness. The knife-edge
on which we walk, however, is creeping dogmatism; i.e., the danger in believing that one
has access to the “ought” as though it were knowledge and not belief. I acknowledge the
problem with walking the knife-edge: it is difficult not to wander off, and the
concentration it takes to keep one’s consistent balance may be too much to ask. Recall
again the difficulties of this approach to ethics: we are going to acknowledge intuition,
but refrain from calling the moral insight either fact or truth, and the source of that insight
will always remain a mystery to us. Indeed, that is the paradox that seems to me to want
to reify itself in natural law as an accessible truth: on one hand, we rely on intuitions
emanating from a mysterious source that cannot be deemed truth or knowledge, and, on
the other hand, we will act on those intuitions which seem to us to have aspects of
universality – i.e. the natural law as applied to the circumstances before us.
The latter issue is, I believe, only resolvable by a conscious effort to defeat the
power of our own reason, and that effort must involve our relationship with others.
I have already suggested reason as a source of universalisms may as much lead to
transcendental illusion, rationalization or self-deception (whatever you want to call it) as
to an acceptable universal moral rule. I have acknowledged the inherent common sense
of virtue ethics, but find it inadequate either for explanation or prescription in difficult
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situations (particularly where the continuum of extreme to extreme wherein I should be
finding the mean is not overly clear, as in conflicts between the good and the better, or
between two evils). So I have proposed a defeasible and reflective intuitionism, but
what, you may fairly ask, is the source of the intuition? Must it not be some variant of
natural law, just, true, unchanging over time and universal, and accessible by human
reason? Indeed, have I staked out a position that tries to be everywhere and is in fact
nowhere, skeptical equally of science and received morality?
It is a fair question to ask what differs between my view of access to ethical
decision making through intuition, and Dworkin insistence that there are objective and
knowable moral facts or truths. I do not agree with his contention that it is bad
philosophy to consider the epistemology of morality, 161 and conclude that there is
something different between the objectivity of knowledge we can test in nature, and the
moral conviction that seems to us objective and yet can never be proved or disproved.
Dworkin’s answer to the mystery at the core (or “all the way down”) is the mirror-image
of the radical skeptic (which we considered earlier). The radical skeptic says there is
nothing all the way down; Dworkin says there has to be something, so you might as well
assume it is in the quotidian moral proposition itself.
To understand why I find Dworkin’s path unsatisfying as a basis for ethics (i.e.
my moral propositions just are what I believe they are, from a first person standpoint, and
what I might assess as correct from a third person standpoint), I want to return once again
to the reason itself. Dworkin acknowledges something about reason and morality: “We
cannot climb outside of morality to judge it from some external archimedean tribunal,
any more than we can climb out of reason itself to test it from above.” So we employ
161
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reason as best we can within morality to determine true propositions, understanding we
cannot test what we take as objective truth, any more than we can test reason.” As
Professor Zangwill, one of the commentators on Objectivity, observed, this is simply the
mirror-image of archimedean skepticism.162 A skeptic holds, but can never prove, that
there is no a priori basis for any moral truth. Dworkin says a moral proposition is
because it is and always has been and always will be, and that is objective, eternal and
unchanging truth. And while I would rather believe Dworkin about what is true than the
skeptic, I still have no basis for concluding Dworkin’s first-order propositions (or my
own for that matter) as products of reason are not the subject of transcendental illusion,
rationalization and self-deception.
Should we make the flame retardant? I think it through and reason to a
conclusion that we should. Suppose I call on Professor Dworkin for his advice on the
ethics of my decision, and he tells me I am wrong, not just because we disagree, but
because it is an objective truth that corporations ought not to be making products whose
side effects can injure unknowing non-users, and the users of products protected by the
flame retardants ought to find another solution. Why is that not a misunderstanding of
the fruits of reason? It seems to me I am justified in responding: “you have worked this
through in your own mind, employing your faculty of reason, and come to a nonempirical conclusion that you have then mistaken for constitutive principles of
transcendent cognition, what you think is knowledge, but which is dazzling but deceptive
illusion, persuasion and imagination.”
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IV.

A SECOND PERSON APPROACH TO GETTING BEYOND REASON
Understanding the role of reason, its capability for rationalization and self-

deception is what focuses us on ethics rather than law. The process of ethics, I contend,
is not just one of reason. Instead, it is the application of determinant judgment (which is
distinct from either theoretical or practical reason) in which the application of the general
to the particular is guided by our most fundamental intuitions about virtue. But the
application of judgment, the determination of duty, is the essence of our personal
autonomy, our freedom to legislate for ourselves the rule we would make universal.
How, then, do we avoid transcendental illusion – mistaking the universality of the
practical rule for a statement of epistemological truth? How can we have confidence our
well-reasoned arguments are not rationalization and self-deception?
The answer is that we can never be sure. The answer lies somewhere in this same
paradox of that which cannot be proved and is yet self-evident – the maddening question
why, if a Designer chose to design the universe, did such Designer leave just enough
evidence of the lack of a design to give the skeptics the basis for the counter-argument?
Indeed, for all of our confidence that we know surely what is right and what is wrong (at
least in the clear cases), we remain open to a smidgen of doubt. Most moral dilemmas
are not as clear as genocide in Bosnia. That is why they are dilemmas. So we permit our
intuitions to be defeasible. But how? The problem, in Kantian terms, starts with the
process of legislating for ourselves our own morality as autonomous agents. For as Kant
recognized, there is no guarantee that each of us will reach the same conclusions. This
solipsistic figure, seeking out the universal law, in the case of Kant’s moral everyman, or
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Judge Hercules, in Dworkin’s vision of the law, is a subject, and nothing compels the
incorporation, or even understanding, of the views of another. Indeed, even the second
articulation of the categorical imperative, the Law of Humanity, is directed at each
agent’s responsibility within himself, and not to addressing another in the second person.
We are to treat others never as means only but always as ends – others are to be subjects,
and worthy of the same respect we would accord ourselves. Because so much about our
moral judgment resides in personal autonomy, it seems to me the check must lie in our
relationship with others, not as objects to be analyzed, but as other subjects each making
his own judgments, some of which may not only conflict with mine, but may be better. If
my own autonomy is first-person, and my analytic relationship with others and the world
is third-person, then the relationship with another moral agent must be second person.
The second-person relationship is already the subject of some discussion within
the legal academy. Robin Bradley Kar, taking from the work of Stephen Darwall, has
attempted to reconcile the “hard” or exclusive positivism of Joseph Raz with the “soft” or
inclusive positivism of H.L.A. Hart.163 Put briefly, the debate is this. Hart’s positivism
identified primary law, the law that affects us from day to day, as that which is issued
pursuant to the Rule of Recognition – the social convention under which certain norms
are recognized as law. Hart seemed to be saying that moral considerations could be part
of primary law, so long as the Rule of Recognition allowed for it. Raz, on the other hand,
viewed law as law only when it provided a reason for acting or not acting exclusive of
any moral consideration. (In other words, law would be meaningless as a basis for action
163
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if it merely mapped precisely on the independent moral reasons, and would be irrational
if it contradicted other good moral reasons for acting. “The claim to legal authority is
based on the thought that the reasons law provides replace the reasons that otherwise
apply to us because acting on the former will enable us more fully to comply with the
latter than we will by acting on the basis of them directly.”164)
Professor Kar’s project is to suggest that Hart can be seen implicitly to have
incorporated Raz’s theory of authority without abandoning the position that moral
considerations can be incorporated into the law. Professor Kar does this by proposing a
view of legal positivism that incorporates a second person perspective – one that is
neither the pure self -reflection of the moral agent, nor the detached perspective of the
third-party observer. “The second personal perspective is the perspective from which we
address one another with claims and grievances, or respond to such claims with apology,
excuse or justification.”165 Rather than focusing solely on the role legal reasons (as
opposed to all other reasons) might play in the first person reflection of the actor,
Professor Kar would justify the role of the law as reason for action from a second person
perspective: “the law provides us with exclusionary reasons for action, which can have
genuine and distinctive practical effects in our lives, insofar as the breach of a legal
obligation – however identified – gives some other person or group the second personal
standing to raise a legal claim for non-compliance.”166
I want to unpack the nature of a second person relationship as it is distinguished
in matters of law – the resolution of claims and grievances – and ethics – the
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consideration of the other in deciding what we ought to do. I think the second person
perspective is critical to overcoming rationalization and self-deception in making ethical
decisions, but I think it is wholly distinct from the justification of law as law by reference
to the second person perspective. Indeed, I would argue what Professor Kar sees as
second person is not really second person at all. In Kelsen’s view, the basic norm is a
priori (i.e., one we must assume at the outset, apart from any experience in the world)
and “a hypothetical judgment that expresses the specific linking of a conditioning
material fact with a conditioned consequence.”167 In assessing the claim of another
person as the basis for acting, the first person actor is really making a scientific third
person assessment of the likelihood that another will succeed when that person invokes
the adjudicative process. That may well reconcile Hart and Raz, but nothing in the theory
compels the actor to consider the position of the second person as a check against
rationalization and self-deception. Indeed, considering the possible legal claims and
grievances of the second person may be nothing more than an invitation to justify our
inclinations and desires by means of the invocation of legal rules. There is nothing in the
process that demands we reconsider our intuitions about the normative rightness of our
position.
Indeed, if we look at Stephen Darwall’s account of the second person relationship,
we get some idea of what it answers and what it does not.168 The essence of the concept
is that there is something different and fundamental in the authority of one person to
demand or claim respect and dignity from another that is distinguishable from what is
167
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essentially a third person contemplation about the respect and dignity owing to persons
generally. Moreover, this relationship is as a priori and synthetic as any categorical
imperative: “To be a person just is to have the authority to address demands as a person
to other persons, and to be addressed by them, within a community of mutually
accountable equals.”169
But Darwall’s construct of the second-person standpoint bears, at least as I
understand it, the same relationship to specific second-person obligations as Kant’s
categorical imperative bears to specific moral decisions generally. That is, it establishes
the idea that there is a basis for making second-person claims and demands, without
suggesting how one might go about determining what one’s obligations to the other are.
The parallels are particularly evident when Darwall accounts for the second-person
standpoint within Kant’s writings on ethics. Self-love – “the ‘natural’ ‘propensity’ to
take ‘subjective determining grounds’ of the will to have normative significance” – can
be cured by one’s own contemplation of the moral law. When we consider whether we
would legislate the principle as a universal rule of nature, we will conclude that our
subjective grounds are not in accord with what we ought to do. Self-conceit, on the other
hand, is the fantasy “that one has a standing to make claims and demands on others that
others do not have.” This problem cannot be cured merely by one’s internal reflection;
the fantasy will be broken only by making the agent accountable to another agent’s
claims and demands.
But with all of this, we have only gotten through the issue of standing, either
legally or morally. What about the second-person claim itself? It is not surprising
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Darwall’s account was attractive to Professor Kar, because it seems to me casting the
second-person relationship as one of right to make claims and demands on another is
essentially legal. It focuses on the rights of the aggrieved party more than it does the
question what the actor ought to do. With the same authority the sergeant issues a drill
order, in reaction to a particular circumstance, A makes a claim of dignity and respect on
B. Now what? What is B supposed to do?
Sometimes we are debating pure issues of fact: If we raise prices, how will our
competitors respond? In an initial public offering, how many shares will we be able to
sell and at what price? What was the cause of the factory fire? Will the acquisition be
accretive to share price? Those matters are properly the subject of argumentation, a
particular kind of communication.170 But practical questions of what we ought to do are
different, because, unlike questions of fact, the answers depend on our interests, and are
not testable against experience. If being ethical means facing down one’s own interests
(whether material interests or one’s stake in one’s own vision of what ought to be), we
know how difficult that will be. Reason’s regulative nature inclines us always to believe
we are dealing in truth, whether or not experience will bear it out. My concern with
Darwall’s structure is where it leaves us hanging: in exercises of rationalization and selfdeception, where A and B employ reason to claims and defend against claims, albeit of a
second-person nature.
How do we go about responding to the second-person claim, to making judgments
what we ethically ought to do, rather than simply determine that to which we are legally
entitled? If we have learned anything so far, it is that all the science in the world will not
tell how to choose. Moreover, we are too humble to believe that we have access to a
170
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single correct answer (as if it were truth) as posited by the modern natural law theorists
and are unsatisfied epistemologically with simply relying on the judgment of virtuous
people, as posited by the virtue ethicists. We are left then only with a continuing mystery
at the heart of judgment, and defeasible intuitionism by which we make non-inferential
judgments to guide our ethical choices.
A.

Truth, Argumentation, and Justification

Trying to establish the normative as truth, as though it were science, is at its most
benign, futile, and at its worst, self-deceptive. As Dennis Patterson has argued, law, as
means of adjudication (i.e. as an institutional way of having a third party determine what
two or more opposing parties ought to do), is an exercise in language, and consists of
argumentation.171 It may consist of civilized discourse, but at its heart, adjudication,
from the parties’ perspective, is an argument about events that took place in the past, in
which the parties and their lawyers tell narratives justifying why each of them is right.
There is no need to see the circumstance from the other party’s point of view, except as a
tactical or strategic matter. Within the bounds set by the procedural and evidentiary
rules, any argument, regardless how ostensible, is permitted.
One can adopt what sounds like a postmodern attitude toward truth, and contend
there is nothing but the subjective (as I think Patterson is wont to argue). It seems to me
the implication of this is the complete denial of any universals obtainable through reason
or intuition. I do not believe that is a necessary conclusion. What I have tried to show
through the first five chapters is that reason itself, by its regulative nature, demands that
we pursue the conditions of propositions “all the way down” in pursuit of an unattainable
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Unconditioned – the “truth.” Where reason pursues matters of experience or possible
experience, we have at least some basis for calling what we conclude “knowledge.”
But in ethics, we deal with the “ought” of responsibility, and separating it from
the “is” of comprehension (as through law as social science) is critical. So Patterson and
I agree that truth is a misplaced objective for the normative. We also agree that the
process by which the resolution of dispute is played out, whether in law or ethics, is in
the medium of language.
Where I think we differ is in the possibility of defeasible universals of which we
are capable, so long as we do not deceive ourselves into believing they represent
knowledge. What is clear is that the parties in adjudicative legal discourse are not
seeking to determine what is right. In discussing the legislative process, Jürgen
Habermas observes, “No doubt one can use moral discourse of application as a model for
investigating legal discourses, for both have to do with the logic of applying norms. But
the more complex validity dimension of legal norms prohibits one from assimilating the
legitimacy of legal decisions to the validity of moral judgments.”172 The adjudicative
process further separates discourse theory from what happens in a trial.
The point is that, for the parties, the game is not to find an answer, but to persuade the
judge that each is right. “The parties are not committed to the cooperative search for
truth, and they can pursue their interest in a favorable outcome through ‘the clever
strategy of advancing arguments likely to win consensus.’”173 Put another way, each
party argues the rule to apply is the one that will benefit the respective party. Because
there is no rule for the application of a rule, we are really arguing that a universal-
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transcendental-idealized norm requires the application of the rule in our favor. That is a
process that may or may not produce justice, but will always involve justification. And
where justification involves rationalization, there lies the possibility of the thirst for
rationality creating lies.
B.

Law, Subjects and Objects

It seems to me, then, we need a way to test whether we are rationalizing the
“ought” to conform to our inclinations and desires, rather than changing what we to do to
correspond with the “ought.” It is possible that our litigation claims are ostensible
reasons and, if we believe them, we are engaged in self-deception. It seems to me we
need to delve deeper into the nature of the second-person relationship, and consider how
we leave ourselves open to the possibility there is merit in what our opponent (real or
imagined) asserts.
To accomplish this, I think, ironically, we need to get beyond reason, and
consider the role of intuition. We have intuitions about the right, and the issue is whether
the intuition is one based in reality and justice, or instead in self-deception and
justification. Searching for a basis of our intuition in truth, or grounding the basis for our
intuition in argument, it seems to me, is misdirected. The first is futile and the second
reinforces whatever tendency we might have to avoid reality and to justify. We are
entitled to our strong intuitions about moral choice; we are not entitled to a view that they
are eternally infallible or indefeasible. How do we walk that line? Not easily. One way
to begin is to consider, when encountering contrary intuitions, the source of the contrary
intuition as subject rather than object. Another is to consider the role of virtues, like
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humility, not to supplant but to mediate what Kant described as the tendency of reason to
dogmatism.174
As an alternative, I want to consider Martin Buber and the concept of “dialogue.”
Buber, notwithstanding his status as one of the foremost philosophers and theologians of
the 20th century, has a reputation as a mystic, yet he is circumspect in his “mystical”
claims and concerned not so much about any person’s relationship with God, as with
relationships with each other. It is to his surprisingly worldly view I turn.
1.

I and You

Calling on Buber for insight into business law and ethics is, no doubt, a long
stretch to many, so I feel compelled at the outset to make clear what this is not about.
The irony is that I and Thou, the primary statement of Buber’s philosophy, is not revered
as a Jewish document – its fame spread as the result of acclaim by Protestant
theologians.175 Moreover, it claimed no access to mystical insight. Walter Kauffman
observed, “What is so remarkable is that a sharp attack on all talk about God and all
pretensions to knowledge about God – a sustained attempt to rescue the religious
dimension of life from the theologians – should have been received so well by
theologians.”176
If I believe that Darwall and Habermas are correct in seeing the second-person
relationship as critical to ethics, but believe at the same time that reason turned back upon
itself as rationalization is corrupting of ethics (whether or not it is civilized as a matter of
dispute resolution), then Buber, to me, articulates the second-person “all the way down.”

174

Daniel Statman, Modesty, Pride & Realistic Self-Assessment, 42 PHIL. Q. 420 (1992).
Walter Kaufmann, I and You: A Prologue, in Martin Buber, I AND THOU, trans. Walter Kauffman
(1970), 20.
176
Id., 20-21.
175

© Jeffrey M. Lipshaw 2006

76

Buber’s own “conversion” was the result of having had a conversation with a young man
who had sought Buber’s advice out of despair. While Buber recalls that he was friendly,
and conversed “attentively and openly,” he had returned from a morning of traditional
“religious” experience (no doubt a morning prayer service), but met with the young man
“without being there in spirit.” The irony was not lost on Buber.177
If what I am arguing is religious, so be it, but if that is the case, then every attempt
to deal with the a priori (unless, of course, we choose the course of simply denying the
apparently a priori) is religious. But just as Darwall claims the second person authority
to make claims and demands just is and yet falls legitimately into secular philosophy
rather than commonly-held notions of what is religious, so too the ensuing discussion of
the second-person relationship that may provide a check on self-deception. No wonder
Walter Kauffman observed about I and Thou: “The book does not save, or seek to prop
up, a tradition. Even less does it aim to save any institution. It speaks to those who no
longer believe but who wonder whether life without religion is bound to lack some
dimension.”178
Why do I say Buber’s philosophy is second-person all the way down? It is
because he takes the second-person relationship to its epistemic limit, one beyond even
the power of reason to make claims and demands and to respond. Buber sees our
relationship not as the world acting upon us, or other acting upon us, but in the very
pairing of us and the world or others. Hence, the third person relationship is not merely
“I” and “It.” Instead, it is symbolized in language by a word pair “I-It.” Similarly, the
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second-person relationship is not “I” and “You.” The relationship itself is a basic word
composed of “I-You.”179
The “I-You” relationship is the unmediated second-person relationship. It is the
pure encounter between two beings. It is not “I” making claims or demands on “you.” A
claim or demand is conceptual. “Nothing conceptual intervenes between I and You, no
prior knowledge and no imagination; and memory itself is changed as it plunges from
particularity into wholeness. No purpose intervenes between I and You, no greed and no
anticipation; and longing itself is changed as it plunges from the dream into appearance.
Every means is an obstacle. Only where all means have disintegrated encounters
occur.”180 It seems to me Buber must have intended this as a reference to Kant’s Formula
of Humanity: there we are obliged always to treat humanity, in ourselves and others, as
an end also and never only as a means. The pure encounter of I and You has no element
of means – You are purely an end.181
Were Buber to expect us to live our lives in a way that the pure encounter of IYou predominates, this would be a journey into a never-never land of mysticism. That is
not his expectation. The third-person relationship with the world as experience is the “IIt.” When we experience the world, the experience occurs in our processing of the
experience – it is not generally a matter of relation with experience. (Buber suggests we
might be in a state where it seems as though we have an I-You relation with nature. His
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example is the contemplation of a tree; mine would be a sunset. The important thing is
that we sense the world not as an observer of third-party experience, but as actually
having a relation with the thing being observed.182) As Walter Kauffman observed,
“Even when you treat me only as a means I do not always mind. A genuine encounter
can be quite exhausting, even when it is exhilarating, and I do not always want to give
myself.”183 Buber said: “Genuine contemplation never lasts long; the natural being that
only now revealed itself to me in the mystery of reciprocity has again become
describable, analyzable, classifiable – the point at which manifold systems of laws
intersect.”184 It is, however, possible to live a life defined entirely by the I-It, and I think
that is a life in which our own reason is paramount, and the thirst for rationality that
creates lies is born. We are able to move back and forth from “It-world” to “You-world,”
and this, it seems to me, is the way we check the process of reason.
One cannot live in the pure present: it would consume
us if care were not taken that it is overcome quickly and
thoroughly. But in pure past one can live; in fact only there
can a life be arranged. One only has to fill every moment
with experiencing and using, and it ceases to burn.
And in all the seriousness of truth, listen: without It a
human being cannot live. But whoever lives only with that
is not human.185
I do not disparage reason any more than Buber disparages the It-world. We
cannot live without the It-world, and we have no ability to move forward in it without
reason. We can justify our positions by reason and never leave the world of experience.
We can hear and respond to the second-person claims and demands of others, and never
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truly enter into an event of relation. We may have discourse in which we analyze and
justify assertions of truth or normative rightness, and still never experience a secondperson relation. Indeed, oftentimes, we will contemplate the circumstances, and conclude
that we do not want to enter into such a relation, either personally or in our business and
professional lives.
It seems to me, however, that a business or professional life, as much as a
personal life, is fraught with the possibility of transcendental illusion, of mistaking
knowledge for belief, or vice versa. In the world of I-It, there is no other acting as a
check on the product of our own reason, because every It is an object or obstacle with
which we must deal. Recall Kant’s skepticism about whether we might ever be able to
know if our determination of the “ought” in a particular circumstance is the product of
practical reason, or our own material inclinations. It is possible that what we learn
during the process of litigation can shed light on our own motivations. But, it seems to
me, without some fundamental change in perspective, our response in the context of
litigation stands a good chance of being rationalization all the way down. For just a
fleeting moment, we need to stand in relation to another, see that other not as an It but a
You, and consider the implications on our choice of action.
2.

Dialogue

Buber plants his feet firmly in this world in Between Man and Man. Buber is
rightly called a theologian, and his writing is no doubt more lyrical than is common for
the hard-headed world of business. But if we take religious dogma as the ultimate in
deeply-held belief, and consider what Buber has to say about dialogue in that context, we
ought to be able, a fortiori, to draw conclusions about secular beliefs no less deeply held.
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The essence of dialogue is rooted in a relationship between one person and another, and
that relationship transforms the nature of the communication. “Moreover it is completed
not in some “mystical” event, but in one that is in the precise sense factual, thoroughly
dovetailed into the common human world and the concrete time-sequence.”186 Dialogue,
moreover, does not occur when I perceive you in my capacity as observer or onlooker:
the person observed “is for them an object separated from themselves.”187 In dialogue, I
perceive in the other person “something, which I cannot grasp in any objective way at all,
that ‘says something’ to me.”188 How I receive this something is a matter of real speech
(not a metaphor for speech), and is second-personal in a way that is even more
fundamental than the second-person authority described by Darwall. 189
This, it seems to me, is the heart of the mystery that lies beyond reason. I think
Buber has touched on our ability to employ reason to rationalize and justify when he
observes:
Each of us is encased in an armour whose task is to ward
off signs. Signs happen to us without respite, living means
being addressed, we would need only to present ourselves
and to perceive. But the risk is too dangerous for us, the
soundless thunderings seem to threaten us with
annihilation, and from generation to generation we perfect
the defence apparatus.190
The moment of intuition, reality untarnished by self-deception, occurs in moments that
“stir the soul to sensibility.”191 I find in Buber’s lyricism the synthesis of all I have
discussed here: an intuitional sense, derived from a second person relationship, that the
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world is something other than what I have rationalized and justified it to be. “It can
neither be interpreted nor translated, I can have it neither explained nor displayed; it is
not a what at all, it is said into my very life; it is no experience that can be remembered
independently of the situation, it remains the address of that moment and cannot be
isolated, it remains the question of a questioner and will have its answer.”192 We check
our tendency to self-deception not by argumentation (which as an exercise of reason is
subject to the same tendency) or even by understanding and responding to an
authoritative second-person claim or demand, but by the inexplicable intuitive insight we
obtain only by hearing and accepting what something says to us. I do not believe that we
are required to satisfy the questioner, but only to hear the question: “The basic
movement of the life of dialogue is the turning towards the other.”193
It is interesting to consider how pragmatic Buber is on the subject of dialogue,
particularly as contrasted with monologue. The problem with monologue is not (as we
have seen) a failure in richness of visions and thoughts. If monologue is reason, and is
checked in the empirical world by correspondence to empirical reality, in matters of
ethics, dialogue is a way we might test the validity of the principles we, in our freedom,
legislate for ourselves. It is not inconsistent with Kantian freedom and autonomy to
observe: “He who is living the life of monologue is never aware of the other as
something that is absolutely not himself and at the same time something with which he
nevertheless communicates.”194 Dialogue is a relationship in which we hear the
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questions of another; it is not altruism and it is not love.195 Indeed, Buber concludes his
introduction to dialogue by confronting the question whether he has articulated an otherworldly mysticism, and not a way of approaching this world. He acknowledges he has
selected his examples as paradigm (“for this reason I appear to draw my tales from the
province which you term the ‘intellectual’ . . .”). He is, however, concerned not with the
pure, but with the mundane break-through.196
3.

Dialogue as the Source of Business Ethics

How could the process of making difficult business decision possibly be informed
by the philosophy of Martin Buber? Buber raises the question himself: “You ask with a
laugh, can the leader of a great technical undertaking practise the responsibility of
dialogue?” and answers “He can.”197 I want to pose some hypothetical situations, and
consider the role of Buberian dialogue in them. I am willing to concede the simultaneous
operation of economic laws and moral laws. In questions of ethics, we are always
dealing with both the right and the good. They are, respectively, the embodiments of the
critical distinction in Kant between autonomy and instrumentality. Our needs in
everyday life – the good – are fulfilled by instrumental relationships all the
time. Physical and economic laws are discernible that govern the satisfaction of what
Kant calls our inclinations (our tangible and intangible needs). The principle of
microeconomics that a rational firm shuts down the plant when the marginal cost
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exceeds the marginal revenue is morally neutral (at least it is to me, but I recognize
others, socialist or critical legal theorists, for example, may disagree).
Audi is correct in perceiving that real-world ethics cannot merely be the elevation
of duty over consequence; there must be some accommodation of principle to pragmatics.
Hence, the “ought” of business must be based on consequence as well as duty. As in the
case of Jack and Stephanie, there is no perfect justice. We might, however, define
achievable justice as the appropriate reconciliation of the “is” and the “ought.” If the
world is not as we believe it ought to be, we may react to the gap in several ways. We
may work to close the gap. Or we may justify the gap. But we must, if we recognize
there is a gap between the is and the ought, reconcile it somehow. The reconciliation
may direct itself outward in action, or inward in contemplation, or both. We can close
the gap by moving the world as it is outwardly closer to the way it ought to be. We may
consider the views of others and conclude that our view of the “ought” needs to change.
But the process of achievable justice is always distinct from justification: that smug selfsatisfaction in the way things are, and, indeed, the proof by means of social science
methodology that way things are is the way they ought to be. Nor is justice the knee-jerk
rejection of anything that is merely because it is or has been that way in favor of a
personal vision of what ought to be.
So I propose an addition to the mix by which we make difficult ethical judgments
not just consideration of Rossian duties and intrinsic value (i.e. the determination of the
good or bad that may result from acting out of a perceived duty). I think we have an
intuitive sense of the extent to which we are rationalizing and justifying that might
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become apparent to us when we consider not just the claims and demands of, but our very
relationship to, another.
a.

Difficult Choices

A troubled company hires a new CEO. Within the first several weeks, it
becomes clear to her that the demand for the company’s product has
diminished almost overnight (like buggy whips or mainframe computers or
VCRs) because of the rapid appearance of a superior substitute. She
determines there is no option but to write off some assets and sell others.
The consequence will be that 2,000 people will be laid off, but for 8,000
others, the business and their jobs have a chance to survive.
This situation, it seems to me, is another difficult choice between the good and the
right. There is no perfect answer, and moral qualms in any course of action, even if
legally justifiable. I believe it is an illusion (indeed, a dangerous one at times) if the “is”
or “ought” prevails automatically, and moral error if there is no struggle to reconcile
them. I think it is an abdication of responsibility in the world of experience not to
consider the need to reduce staff if conditions warrant, and to act on the need. The moral
question, on the other hand, is: are they people or things to you morally at the time the
real world makes you do that? How do you handle the layoffs? Do you provide
outplacement? Is the severance sufficient? Have you developed your employees so they
have transferable marketable skills? Take the example regarding the toxicity of the flame
retardant chemicals. To what extent is the decision being motivated by short-term
earnings versus scientific evidence? To what extent is the view of the evidence itself
tainted by the outcome you want it to show?
b.

Opportunism

Your client is a large Atlantic City hotel/casino. It has a non-binding
letter of intent under which a frozen yogurt shop owner will close her
operation in Newark and take space in the hotel. The negotiations have
been going on for six months but no final binding agreement has ever been
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signed. The corporate development officer of the owner of the
hotel/casino says "We have just come up with a more synergistic
alternative to fill the space, and, now that we think about it, it's really a
better deal. Is there any reason why we can't do it?"198
In economic theory, at least, “the fundamental function of contract law . . . is to
deter people from behaving opportunistically toward their contracting parties, in order to
encourage the optimal timing of economic activity and (the same point) obviate costly
self-protective measures.”199 The preceding hypothetical is taken from a New Jersey
case in which the court held the hotel/casino liable on a theory of promissory estoppel,
even though a definitive agreement (one that presumably would have embodied the
promise) had never been executed. I once argued to my contracts class that the case,
even if correctly decided on its particularly egregious facts, should not be expanded to
impose the gray standards of reasonable reliance on the kinds of pre-contractual
investments a sophisticated party might make in a complex business deal. But the law on
that subject is relatively indeterminate and results hard to predict, even under law and
economics.200
Does this situation invoke an ethical issue? I think so. I am not sure whether the
law should or should not incorporate the doctrine of promissory estoppel in this situation,
but I have no problem in concluding, were I the hotel/casino management, that we were
ethically bound to our word, and that, in any event, taking the position that we were
wholly without any responsibility, legally or otherwise, because there was no completed
contract would have been wrong. Part of my intuition in this particular case has to do
with the relative size of the parties, because I do not have the same intuition about pulling
198
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out of a deal well into the negotiation in say, a merger of equals between two very large
companies where there is no legal obligation to close.
The beloved manager of a plant in a small town in Alabama dies in a freak
boating accident over the Memorial Day weekend. It turns out he had
already been “managed out” of the organization and his severance
package was dependent on his staying with the company for a transitional
six-month period. By dying, he has technically not fulfilled the condition
of the severance package. His company-sponsored life insurance is,
however, available to his young widow.
I was faced with this issue. Our divisional vice president of human resources
asked me to get involved in defending the decision a business unit human resources
director had made to deny the severance benefit to the widow, and to leave her only with
the life insurance benefits (the theory being that, by dying, the manager had failed to
fulfill his end of the deal). I listened to the situation, and argued that it was untenable for
us to be taking that position, regardless of the technicalities of the employment
agreement. Clearly, there were utilitarian arguments – what would the effect on the
company be if we were perceived to be taking an unjust or overly technical view in a
dispute with the young widow of a beloved employee in a small town? It seemed to me,
however, that there was a deeper issue of right and wrong. (Fortunately, our corporate
vice president of human resources overruled the decision, and both benefits were paid.)
I tell the story not to demonstrate any unusual righteousness on my part, but to
demonstrate what I think most of us sense without knowing the source: doing the right
thing is something beyond the use of instrumental reason and the employment of norms
and maxims (including legal norms) to achieve an end. It involves the whole of one’s
substance, one’s active participation in all of the reality of the world, not merely reliance
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on habits and customs. 201 Do we then live in some kind of moral anarchy, without
norms, and in reliance on each person’s intuition? Again, I find something of a satisfying
answer in Buber, consisting with something I have said before: all we can do is commit
ourselves to the struggle to reconcile law and equity, rules and exceptions, and live the
question. 202 And, finally, we undertake the struggle not just in our solitary reflections
(which may be self-deceiving) but from a second person standpoint, cognizant of our
relationships with our opponents as well as our allies.
c.

Conflicts with Business Opponents

The company has signed a definitive agreement to sell one of its divisions.
The acquiring company has had trouble raising money for the purchase.
The definitive agreement provides Seller may factor accounts receivable
of the division until the closing. In practice, what this means is that Seller
sells the accounts receivable to a bank (a factor) for a small discount, and
takes the cash out of the business. Under the framework of the agreement,
it all should work out in the wash, because the post-closing adjustment,
which compares the net assets of the division as of the closing with a base
line net asset figure, should account for it. Acting on this legal right, the
company has factored $50 million in receivables, and so it will owe the
Buyer that $50 million (plus interest) in about six months when the parties
resolve all the post-closing adjustment claims. On the day of the closing,
Buyer advises the company that its financing is conditioned on the
accounts receivable being there to help finance the business over that
intervening six months, and because of what Seller did (perfectly
permissible under the contract), $50 million will be missing from the
business. The Buyer will be in breach of loan covenants from the day it
first owns the business, and perhaps even insolvent in the equity sense
(unable to pay bills as they come due). Hence it is threatening not to
close.
What I have found unique among great business leaders is their ability to listen to
their own lawyers and executives argue passionately why the company’s position is right,
and then make decisions that transcend the particular legal rights and duties in play at the
time. While it is certainly possible this is a wholly consequential process, my casual
201
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empiricism is that it is not. In considering the opponent, the great business leader thinks
of her not only as means, but as ends also. I believe it is because the leader puts herself,
in reality or hypothetically, in an event of relation with the other side, and sees the
dispute from the perspective of the other leader.
The preceding story was in fact the circumstance we faced as sellers in closing an
acquisition valued at almost three-quarters of a billion dollars. As a result of prior
disagreements, the deal had been re-negotiated to require the buyer to pay $100 million in
liquidated damages if it failed to close. For whatever reason, the buyer did not tell us
about the problem it faced until late in the evening preceding the scheduled closing. I
was at the law office where we were preparing the closing documents; the senior
executives of the buyer were present, but our company’s senior executives were not. We
scheduled a conference call between the buyer’s executives and our chief financial officer
at 2:00 p.m. The arguments were like ships passing in the night. In particular, our CFO
kept repeating the theme that the contract gave us the right to do what we did, and it was
the buyer’s fault if it did not read or understand the contract. The call ended in an
impasse.
I was the working in-house lawyer for the company; my job was to get the deal
closed. It was not to make fundamental decisions about whether to stand on our contract
rights and litigate, or make a concession and close. I was sure that the buyer was not
bluffing; unlike our other executives I could see the sweat beads and the shaking hands
during the two o’clock call. A solution was available: we could reverse the effect of the
factoring, and put the cash back into the business, but it would mean losing the leverage
that the CFO wanted in the post-closing adjustments by being the party owing the money
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(an instance of the Golden Rule in business: “he who has the gold rules”). I participated
in a phone call with my boss, the company’s general counsel, the CFO, and the
company’s chairman and chief executive officer, widely regarded as one of the great
business leaders of his generation. I listened to the CFO argue his position to the CEO,
why it is was we had been justified in factoring the receivables under the contract, his
distrust of the buyer’s inclination to perform a fair post-closing adjustment, and his desire
to have the leverage by holding the cash. The CEO listened, and quickly replied, in so
many words, “look, whatever the contract said, I would have been upset with us too, if
the other side had done that.” Our internal impasse broke; we made the decision to put
the cash back, and the deal closed.
The important thing to understand is that the CEO’s reaction was not a foregone
conclusion. Whether the decision itself was ethical, whether it emanated from some idea
of moral duty or consequentialism, nevertheless, it was different than a purely legal
calculation of rights and duties under the contract. And its essence, it seems to me, was
for just a moment, considering not just the claim of the other, but the relation with the
other.
d.

Conflicts between Right and Right

You are managing a fairly significant piece of litigation. Your view of the
probability of an unfavorable outcome will likely determine both whether
the case is disclosed to the public, and whether an accounting reserve is
set (i.e. the estimate of liability is taken as a current expense). Intuitively,
you know there is about a 75% chance the case will end up settling for a
figure that is material to the company’s earnings in a specific quarter, but
almost no chance that it will threaten the long-term viability of the
company.
The context here is not direct conflict, but issues between people in an organization
whose job responsibilities drive them toward different conclusions on particular issues.
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Think, for example, of the inherent conflict between the sales department and the credit
department. What is the function of the sales department and how it is measured? The
answer is: by selling products to customers. Of course, if the bill is not collectable, there
is no profit and the sale was pointless. But if the sales department is measured on sales
(or more significantly, sees its own success in terms of making sales), the collection of
the proceeds is someone else’s problem. Someone else is the credit department, which is
measured on collections (or more significantly, sees its own success in terms of having a
low bad debt as a percentage of sales). There is a natural conflict between sales and
credit.
Consider the information technology department. The IT department is generally
managed by a senior IT vice president in the corporate office. The job of the IT
department is, among other things, to insure dependability and security in the company’s
computer networks. That takes money. The job of the business division is to make
profits, which involve increasing revenues and reducing costs. When the IT relies on its
functional expertise to incur costs in the business division, there is a natural conflict with
the leader of the division whose job it is to reduce costs.
Lawyers are not immune from this kind of conflict. In he hypothetical at the
beginning of this section, let us now also assume the CEO believes the company’s stock
price will fall in the short term if the current earnings are required to reflect a charge for
the outcome of the present litigation. Moreover, there are no other litigation charges for
the quarter, and so disclosure of the litigation reserve that would be established will tell
the other side not only how much the company expects to have to pay, but that the
amount has already been reserved, so that future earnings will not be affected (although
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cash flow will be) if the case is settled up to that amount. The auditors insist, on the other
hand, that if the lawyers believe there is more than a 50% probability of an unfavorable
outcome, and the amount can be reasonable estimated, that amount must be reflected as a
charge to current earnings.
What are the implications of law and ethics in this situation? Under the securities
laws, the company would be liable if it made a materially misleading statement or
omitted to state a fact required to make a statement not misleading.203 We may assume
that, if litigation outcome is material, failure to disclose it would be an omission making
the financial statements misleading. Moreover, under the Statement of Financial
Accounting Standards No. 5 (“FAS 5”), part of the definition of generally accepted
accounting principles (“GAAP”), if an event is probable and the amount of the loss is
reasonably estimable, FAS 5 requires that the obligation be booked as an accrual (an
expense, and hence a charge to earnings) on the income statement and a liability on the
balance sheet. 204 Accountants and auditors use the word “probable” to indicate one of
three different states of likelihood – the other two are “reasonably possible” and “remote”
– that future events will confirm the incurrence of a liability. “Probable” is defined as
“[t]he future event or events are likely to occur.” Telling an auditor one has a better than
even chance of losing a case in which the amount of the loss can be estimated is
tantamount to incurring the expense. Lawyers, on the other hand, use loose language of
probability to convey a sense of the outcome to their clients on a regular basis. “Your
odds of winning are 50-50, 60-40, one in ten, etc.” The ABA has attempted to cover
these conflicting uses of language in its Statement of Policy Regarding Lawyers’
203
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Responses to Auditors’ Requests for Information by claiming that accountants and
lawyers simply use the word “probable” in different ways. 205
I can say categorically that I do not know what the ethical answer is, or even if
this constitutes an issue of ethics. The ABA policy provides enough cover for a lawyer to
justify a conclusion that any outcome is not “probable” by disclaiming any meaning to
the way lawyers refer to the probabilities of outcomes (the justification being that the
amount of variability in the estimate means that the statement of probability is inherently
unreliable). What I do know is that lawyers, auditors, and CEOs will often butt heads
over the answer not in any sense because they want to get to the right answer, but because
they believe they have a professional responsibility to put the answer in a particular way.
The accountants and auditors want to follow the dictates of GAAP; the lawyer wants to
avoid prejudicing her ability to litigate the case to a favorable outcome; and in the face of
conflicting views from the professional functions, the CEO is inclined not to take a
charge to earnings anything that is not required (unless, of course, he views it as being to
his advantage to take the charge, in which case several of the positions are reversed).
V.

CONCLUSION
Obviously, Martin Buber never faced any of these particular situations. But he

did suggest a concept of ethical character I believe is as applicable in business as it is in
any personal decision we might face. It starts with facing every bit of reality inherent in
the situation – oneself, one’s colleagues, one’s adversary, the uncomfortable possibility
205

Id., at 409-10 (“Concepts of probability inherent in the usage of terms like “probable” or “reasonably
possible” or “remote” mean different things in different contexts. Generally, the outcome of, or the loss
which may result from, litigation cannot be assessed in any way that is comparable to a statistically or
empirically determined concept of “probability”. . . . Lawyers do not generally quantify for clients the
“odds” in numerical terms; if they do, the quantification is generally only undertaken in an effort to make
meaningful, for limited purposes, a whole host of judgmental factors applicable at a particular time, with
any intention to depict “probability” in any statistical, scientific or empirically-grounded sense.”)

© Jeffrey M. Lipshaw 2006

93

that a rule does apply or does not apply, the uncomfortable possibility that one’s most
deeply held beliefs or desires are wrong, or might not be satisfied. 206
I started my career as a litigator, and how I approached conflict was structured by
maxims and habits. Our goals were dictated by our clients’ demands, and we worked
within a constrained model, like rational frogs, employing instrumental legal reasoning to
win the argument. I used to suggest that one of the differences between being a business
litigator and a transactional lawyer was the familiarity with the turf. In business
litigation, the business person is in the realm of the lawyer and his system. The maxims,
habits, customs are foreign to the business people. Data, such as hearsay, on which she
might normally rely in making a decision, is legally irrelevant. The mode of discourse, as
borne out by every pre-testimony preparation session between witness and lawyer, is
artificial and designed not for explanation but for advantage.
When I became a transactional lawyer later in my career, the turf changed. In a
business deal, the transactional lawyer is on the business turf. At least at first, the
maxims, habits, and customs are foreign to one trained in the law. But after a while,
those maxims, habits and customs become clear. There is a sequence to the completion
of an acquisition. There is appropriate disclosure, and an understanding, by and large, of
the rules by which risk is allocated between buyer and seller. Nevertheless, our goals
continued to be dictated by the clients’ demands, and we employed the tools of our trade
to accomplish them.
It was not until I was an in-house lawyer that the distinction between being a great
lawyer and having ethical character began to become clear to me. (That is not to say that
lawyers cannot have great ethical character. Of course they can. But it arises outside of
206
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the mere application of maxims and habits.) I remember feeling, and expressing to a
former law firm colleague, that every bit of my personality, every bit of accumulated
wisdom (such as it was) or experience, factored into the advice I was giving, and the
decisions I was making.
When I am faced with a hard choice, I fear nothing like my ability to persuade
myself. Kant understood that we can never really tell if the principle of our action is
determined by our material wants and inclinations, or by recognition of the universality
of the rightness in what we are choosing. I agree. Whether in our own minds, or in a
group of like-minded executives, we are wholly capable of mistaking what makes us
happy or fulfilled for what is right. And the only check on the power of reason, and its
thirst for rationality that produces lies, is openness to the insight and reality, however
uncomfortable or distasteful or opposed to my own reasoned conclusions, that come from
another.
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